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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The hierocratic theory of papal monarchy is said by some modern historians to have 
been systematic in character and the dominant way of understanding the papacy in the 
thirteenth century. As such, the hierocratic theory bears a strong resemblance to how 
the concept ‘paradigm’ from Thomas Kuhn’s book The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions has been popularly understood. This apparently harmonious match is 
used in this dissertation as the means by which both the hierocratic and the popular 
understanding of papal monarchy are analysed and critiqued. This dissertation argues 
that in the thirteenth century there was a variety of beliefs concerning the nature of the 
papal office. In the course of arguing this point, what Kuhn meant by ‘paradigm’ is 
clarified, along with showing the difficulties of extending use of his paradigm concept 
beyond the context of modern science.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The original aim of this dissertation was to test the viability of the concept of 
‘paradigm’ as advanced by Thomas Kuhn as a shorthand summary of the 
ecclesiological position of the Latin Church in the thirteenth century. Arguably, 
disputes with the Greek Church and the long-term failure of dialogue stemmed from 
conflicting ecclesiologies;1 there was no theory-neutral space between the Latin and 
Greek ways of understanding the Church and its supreme authority. At the councils 
Lyons II (1274) and Ferrara-Florence (1438-9), the East and the West spoke from 
incommensurably different viewpoints. This is where Kuhn’s book The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions comes in,2 for Kuhn said ‘proponents of competing paradigms 
are always at least slightly at cross-purposes’.3 ‘Paradigm’ would encapsulate how the 
two churches with their different paradigms talked at cross-purposes, problems arising 
from their entrenched worldviews, and how by logic or argument one could not 
convince the other of their position. The idea was this dissertation would be an 
exercise in ascertaining whether the ecclesiology of the Latin Church in the thirteenth 
century constituted a paradigm.  
0 
Soon after commencing research, it became clear that the paradigm concept is 
muddled. An aim of this dissertation is to clarify what Kuhn meant by ‘paradigm’. 
The term’s apparent vacuity and centrality to Kuhn’s work has enabled SSR to 
                                                          
1 For a succinct introduction to the central issues of the conflict, see John Doran, 
‘Rites and Wrongs: the Latin Mission to Nicaea, 1234’, Studies in Church History, 
vol. 32, 1996, pp. 131-144. 
2 Kuhn, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1962 (first edition), 1970 (second edition, with Postscript), 1996 
(third edition). The Postscript of the second edition of SSR will be discussed in 
Chapter Three, section ‘a’.  
3 SSR, p. 148.  
 7
flourish beyond the physical sciences.4 Ideas found in Kuhn’s book rapidly made their 
way into politics,5 social sciences,6 and the arts. ‘Everybody and their aunt’7 has felt 
free to cite Kuhn, drawing a negative reaction from SSR’s author: “But I didn’t say 
that!”8 Kuhn ‘tended to discourage the extension of his ideas to forms of culture other 
than science’.9 In fact, Kuhn himself gradually stopped using the term ‘paradigm’.10 
Kuhn’s fears can be understood by looking at how the paradigm concept has been 
used in medieval history. 
 
The three works of medieval history most clearly connected with the paradigm 
concept are Willemien Otten,’s From Paradise to Paradigm: A Study of Twelfth-
Century Humanism and the essay collections Paradigms in Medieval Thought 
Applications and Medieval Paradigms.11  
 
                                                          
4 Steve Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times, Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2000, pp. 390-1. 
5 Ibid., p. 1. 
6 Above all, in sociology: see esp. Barry Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science, 
London: MacMillan, 1982, passim.  
7 R. Klee, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Cutting Nature at the Seams, 
Oxford: OUP, 1997, p. 130.  
8 T. S. Kuhn et al., ‘A Discussion with Thomas S. Kuhn. A Physicist who became a 
Historian for Philosophical Purposes’, Neusis, vol. 6, 1997, p. 188 (quoted in Hanne 
Andersen, On Kuhn, Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 2001, p. 6).  
9 Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science, p. 15. 
10 Even by 1976 he was able to discuss the history of science without using the 
concept, such as in his article ‘Mathematical Versus Experimental Traditions in the 
Development of Physical Science’. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 7, 
1976, pp. 1-31. Reprinted in John Rajchman and Cornel West (eds.), Post-Analytic 
Philosophy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, pp. 166-97.  
11 Stephanie Hayes-Healy (ed.), Medieval Paradigms: Essays in Honor of Jeremy 
duQuesnay Adams, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005 (in two volumes). Nancy 
van Deusen and Alvin E. Ford (eds.), Paradigms in Medieval Thought Applications in 
Medieval Disciplines: A Symposium. Medieval Studies, vol. 3, Lampeter: The Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1990. Willemien Otten, From Paradise to Paradigm: A Study of 
Twelfth-Century Humanism, Leiden: Brill, 2004. 
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Otten uses ‘paradigm’ as the static antithesis of the ‘paradise’ of twelfth-century 
humanism’s fluidity. As humanism faded, ‘paradise was transformed from a 
polyvalent integumentum into a stock-still paradigm’.12 Elsewhere Otten refers to a 
‘hermeneutical paradigm’,13 and an ‘overarching cultural paradigm’.14 ‘Paradigm’ in 
these three quotations from Otten seemingly refer—respectively—to (i) a feeling of 
intellectual pace (or lack of), (ii) a means of reading a text, and (iii) a universal ethos 
of the age. There is no easy way of explaining how uses (i)—(iii) are equivalent or 
what root they share.  
 
Confusion concerning paradigm is not limited to Otten’s book. With respect to 
Medieval Paradigms, some essays, such as Richard Kay’s ‘Flash of Effulgence? 
Mental Illumination in Dante’s Paradiso 33.141’,15 do not contain a reference to 
‘paradigm’ at all, nor does the index. Elsewhere, paradigm appears to mean—among 
other things—‘example’,16 ‘pattern’,17 and  ‘custom’.18 Similarly, in the collection 
Paradigms in Medieval Thought Applications, paradigm has no fixed meaning. 
Variously it means ‘theme’,19 ‘motif’,20 ‘conceptual background’,21 ‘mental 
                                                          
12 Otten, From Paradise to Paradigm, p. 42. 
13 Ibid., p. 221. 
14 Ibid., p. 283. 
15 Richard Kay, ‘Flash of Effulgence? Mental Illumination in Dante’s Paradiso 
33.141’, in Hayes-Healy (ed.), Medieval Paradigms, vol. 2, pp. 169-80.  
16 Alexander Murray, ‘Beware of Universities: A Cautionary Tale from Paris, 1380-
81’, in Hayes-Healy (ed.), Medieval Paradigms, vol. 1, p. 29. 
17 Elizabeth Haluska-Rausch, ‘Widows and Noble Remarriage in Eleventh-and-
Twelfth-Century Montpellier’, in Hayes-Healy (ed.), Medieval Paradigms, vol. 1, p. 
99. 
18 Annemarie Weyl Carr, ‘Cypriot Funerary Icons: Questions of Convergence in a 
Complex Land’, in Hayes-Healy (ed.), Medieval Paradigms, vol. 1, p. 153. 
19 Crerar Douglas, ‘The Paradigm of Aristotelian Tragedy in the Theology of Thomas 
Aquinas’, in van Deusen and Ford (eds.),  Paradigms in Medieval Thought 
Applications, p. 123; Thomas J. Mathiesen, ‘Music, Aesthetics, and Cosmology in 
Early Neo-Platonism’, in van Deusen and Ford (eds.), Paradigms in Medieval 
Thought Applications, p. 39; L. Georgianna, ‘The Economy of Salvation in The 
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images’,22 a new purpose/way of interpreting a discipline,23 or rival ways of 
interpreting and doing something.24 ‘Paradigm’ in the title of a collection would 
appear to serve little purpose other than for providing a technical-sounding concept to 
unify what are otherwise disparate essays.  
 
Moving away for a moment from recent Medieval Studies appropriations of the term, 
does ‘paradigm’ have a more general popular meaning? What Kuhn himself meant by 
paradigm ‘is not easily discernible’.25 Nevertheless, Frederick Crews has stated that a 
typical reading of SSR maintains Kuhn 
‘demonstrated that any two would-be paradigms, or regnant major theories, will be 
incommensurable; that is, they will represent different universes of perception and 
explanation’.26
Similarly, Dudley Shapere, commenting on the impression gained from reading 
Kuhn’s first edition, thought that Kuhn regarded paradigms as having ‘unity’ and 
‘controlling status’, and that they constituted ‘a coherent, unified viewpoint, a single 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Canterbury Tales’, in van Deusen and Ford (eds.), Paradigms in Medieval Thought 
Applications, p. 149.  
20 Frederick van Fleteren, ‘The Ascent of the Soul in the Augustinian Tradition’, in 
van Deusen and Ford (eds.),  Paradigms in Medieval Thought Applications, p. 93.  
21 Nancy van Deusen, ‘The Paradigm of ‘Figura’ and its Importance for an 
Understanding of Rhythm’, in van Deusen and Ford (eds.), Paradigms in Medieval 
Thought Applications, p. 67. 
22 Birgitta Lindros Wohl, ‘Mental Images and Late Medieval Maps of Bonne’, in van 
Deusen and Ford (eds.),  Paradigms in Medieval Thought Applications, p. 180. 
23 Ezel Kural Shaw, ‘Ibn Khaldûn’s New Science’, in van Deusen and Ford (eds.),  
Paradigms in Medieval Thought Applications, pp. 22-3. 
24 Richard J. Wingell, ‘Medieval Music Treatises: Speculatio Versus Institutio’, in van 
Deusen and Ford (eds.),  Paradigms in Medieval Thought Applications, pp. 159-60.  
25 Alexander Bird, Thomas Kuhn, Chesham 2000, p. 67. 
26 F. Crews, ‘In the Big House of Theory’, The New York Review of Books, May 29, 
1986 (quoted in Ken Wilber, The Marriage of Sense and Soul: Integrating Science 
and Religion, Dublin: Gateway, 2001, p. 27).  
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overarching Weltanschauung, a disciplinary zeitgeist’.27 Returning to the Medieval 
Studies essay-collections,  a number of the essays impose semantic fields of unity 
(‘theme’, Otten’s ‘overarching cultural paradigm’) and epistemology (‘conceptual 
background’) onto the paradigm concept. In Chapter Three the true worth of the 
epistemological angle on the paradigm concept will be shown. Nevertheless, with the 
popular understanding of the paradigm concept there would even appear to be 
ambiguity concerning to what the epistemological element refers. Phrases such as 
‘disciplinary zeitgeist’, ‘major regnant theories…[which] represent different universes 
of perception’, and ‘pattern’ could be construed as if there was a form of 
epistemological determinism pertaining to the ‘major regnant theory’ itself. Thus, on 
the popular interpretation, the paradigm concept is a dominant theme, theory, or way 
of doing things which is unified and coherent. Somehow, maybe in virtue of its 
dominance, it has an epistemologically-determining property which instils its content 
into the minds of all those within the empirical proximity, perhaps due to the theory 
being deeply entrenched in the culture of a particular place. Acknowledging that there 
are differences between themes, theories, and ways of doing things, they will be 
subsumed under the term ‘theory’.  
 
Kuhn’s terminology in SSR’s first edition helped to encourage this popular view of his 
concept’s meaning. Talk of a theory becoming a paradigm when it began to 
‘dominate’ its field—for one reason or another (either a theory’s usefulness or its 
adoption by a powerful agent)—can be found in Kuhn’s book. With domination there 
is no more debate in the field, foundational first principles now having been 
                                                          
27 D. Shapere, ‘The Paradigm Concept’. Science, vol. 172, 1971, p. 707. 
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established.28 The obsession with regnant theories stems from Kuhn’s use of major 
theoretical works, such as Newton’s Principia and Aristotle’s Physics, as examples of 
paradigms.29 These examples also gave the impression that a paradigm has to be a 
unified and systematised ‘coherent tradition’.30 As for paradigm’s mysterious 
epistemological quality, Kuhn could, for instance, say that ‘Paradigms determine 
large areas of experience at the same time’.31 The ‘paradigms’ are the subjects of this 
causality, personified as if they had agency themselves. Moreover, whenever there are 
paradigms they are epistemologically ‘determining’, either generally/culturally and/or 
specifically for experts in a discipline.32
 
In contrast to the vague ways in which paradigm has been construed, many historians 
have described the notion of papal monarchy in the thirteenth century with some 
confidence. Take, for example, the title of John Watt’s book: The Theory of Papal 
Monarchy in the Thirteenth Century: The Contribution of Canonists.33 Watt’s title 
implies that there was only one theory of papal monarchy in the thirteenth century. 
From other authors there have been assertions of disjunctive change, either at the 
beginning or in the middle of the thirteenth century, changes which established 
homogeneity of belief in a certain view of papal monarchy—the ‘hierocratic’ or 
‘papalist’ understanding of the papacy—for at least half a century or more. These are 
opinions to be outlined in Chapter One. It will be argued that there is a great similarity 
between the popular understanding of what Kuhn meant by a ‘paradigm’ and this 
                                                          
28 SSR, pp. 17-20. 
29 Ibid., p. 10. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., p. 129.  
32 This issue will be discussed in Chapter Three, especially section ‘c’.   
33 John Watt, The Theory of Papal Monarchy in the Thirteenth Century, London: 
Burns and Oates, 1965, passim.  
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monolithic, disjunctive understanding of papal monarchy. There are two constructions 
to be tested: i) the hierocratic theory, and ii) the popular understanding of the 
paradigm concept and its applicability to the non-scientific domain. These two tests 
are mutually exclusive except insofar as the former is being used to test the latter. 
Post-1962, SSR may have influenced Church historians, but which historians used 
SSR is not a subject for investigation.  
 
Beyond being a triumph for interdisciplinarity, the value of the identification of the 
popular conception of the paradigm concept with the hierocratic theory would be 
threefold. Firstly, it would give a clearer meaning to the paradigm concept. Secondly, 
if the meaning of the paradigm concept was understood, ‘the paradigm of thirteenth 
century papal monarchy’ would provide a shorthand for the statement that thirteenth 
century papal monarchy was a major regnant theory which became dominant at an 
approximate time and which subsequently, at least for a while, exerted a self-
perpetuating determining influence on the minds of all those who came across it. 
Thirdly, by ‘creatively reconstructing and selectively bringing the past to the present, 
in the light of current questions’, today’s concepts can be used to analyse the past 
from ‘an external, analytic vantage point’.34
 
Chapter One will outline a prima facie convincing match between an interpretation of 
the popular construal of the paradigm concept as identified here with the modern 
historiographical construct of the hierocratic theory of papal monarchy and a historio-
methodological understanding of the faith of the ‘average’ Christian. This match will 
then be tested: Chapter Two will critique the historiographical construct of the 
                                                          
34 Mary Fulbrook, Historical Theory, London and New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 85. 
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hierocratic theory of papal monarchy, while in Chapter Three, Chapter Two’s findings 
will be related to the ways in which Kuhn responded to criticisms of vagueness by his 
attempts to clarify the paradigm concept in the Postscript to the second edition of SSR. 
Furthermore, Chapter Three will be used to analyse the historio-methodological 
understanding of the faith of the ‘average’ Christian used in Chapter One. Finally, the 
findings will be presented in the Conclusion. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE HIEROCRATIC THEORY AND THE POPULAR 
CONCEPTION OF THE PARADIGM CONCEPT 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to link the most popular conception of the paradigm concept 
as already outlined with what has often been put forward as the most systematic 
account of the medieval papacy in the thirteenth century: the ‘hierocratic theory’. 
Structurally, the popular understanding of the paradigm concept will be matched to a 
strong trend of twentieth-century historiography concerning thirteenth-century papal 
monarchy which identifies a ‘hierocratic theory’ of papal monarchy during this 
period. Having outlined this trend, what is meant by the hierocratic theory will be 
explained by recreating it, mainly by using original sources cited as evidence for its 
existence. Before concluding this chapter, the link between the popular understanding 
of the paradigm concept and the hierocratic theory of papal monarchy will be 
strengthened by explaining how the latter determined how papal monarchy was 
understood in the thirteenth century. 
 
2. A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL NOTE CONCERNING THIRTEENTH 
CENTURY PAPAL MONARCHY 
Modern discussions of papal monarchy by historians (more mid-twentieth century 
than in recent years) often highlight the following three characteristics. Firstly, the 
discussion is often limited to canon lawyers until the very end of the thirteenth 
century, where the focus switches to the papal publicists. Secondly, disjunctive 
change occurred midway through the century when the hierocratic theory (also known 
as the ‘hierocratic doctrine’, or the ‘papalist’ or ‘extreme’ theory of the papacy, 
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according to which secular rulers hold their power from the pope, the latter able to 
intervene in the former’s affairs directly) became the dominant theory over other 
alternatives. Finally, this hierocratic theory is seen as ‘systematic’ in character. 
 
Tierney has said ‘after a generation’s discussion of Innocent III’s legislation, a major 
shift…occurred in canonistic thinking from the prevailing dualism of the late twelfth 
century to the dominant hierocratism of the mid-thirteenth’.35 ‘Major shift’ implies 
disjunctive change, and ‘dominant’ echoes Kuhnian language. The change in question 
was Pope Innocent IV (1243-54) drawing conclusions from Pope Innocent III’s 
(1198-1216) premises which the latter was not willing to draw himself, creating the 
hierocratic theory as a ‘system’,36 or ‘hierocratic system’.37 Afterwards, canon 
lawyers, especially Hostiensis (fl. c.1250-70), continued to build on Innocent IV’s 
foundations.38 Papal publicists at the end of the century, such as Giles of Rome and 
James of Viterbo, put the hierocratic theory into its most philosophical form.39 
Finally, Boniface VIII summarised this theory in law with his bull from November 
1302: Unam Sanctam. As Watt puts it: ‘Unam sanctam enshrined the Hostiensian and 
canonistic logic’.40 Therefore, ‘The’ theory of papal monarchy in the thirteenth 
                                                          
35 Brian Tierney, “Tria Quippe Distinguit Iudicia…’ A Note on Innocent III’s 
Decretal Per Venerabilem’, Speculum, vol. 37, 1962, p. 58. See also CCS, pp. 150, 
152-3. 
36 M. Pacaut, ‘L’autorité Pontificale Selon Innocent IV’, Le Moyen Age, vol. 66, 1960, 
pp. 87-8. See also Carlyle V, pp. 324, 355. 
37 Michael Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages: The Papal 
Monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists, Cambridge: CUP, 1963, pp. 
202, 254. 
38 Carlyle V, p. 337. 
39 C. H. McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West, New York: 
MacMillan, 1959 (first published 1932), p. 249. See also Carlyle (V, pp. 318, 355, p. 
394) for theoretical continuity from Innocent IV up to and including the publicists.  
40 Watt, The Theory, p. 133. 
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century came from ‘The Contribution of the Canonists’,41 but its most forceful and 
developed form came from the publicists. That canonists from at least the middle of 
the thirteenth century have been seen as subscribing to substantially the same theory 
as the publicists of the late thirteenth and fourteenth can be seen by Wilks citing 
Innocent IV as an ‘earlier hierocratic theory’ writer,42 while he styles Augustinus 
Triumphus—writing early in the fourteenth century—as a ‘late hierocratic writer’.43 
Judgements on the chronology vary (some historians have argued Innocent III 
established the hierocratic theory44), but the judgement of wholesale acceptance of the 
hierocratic theory in the thirteenth century from at least its middle point, and possibly 
earlier, to its end has been an attractive view.45 The ‘hierocratic theory’ which 
‘dominated’ from at least the mid-thirteenth century onwards is very reminiscent of 
the coherent ‘major regnant theories’ which are the ‘dominant’ paradigms of the 
popular understanding of the Kuhnian conception of science.  
 
Certainly, there have been historians who have disagreed with this scheme of things. 
Some, such as the Carlyle brothers, created a picture of unanimity,46 only to sound 
caution.47 Other historians have rejected theory-building altogether in favour of 
                                                          
41 The subtitle of Watt’s 1965 book. 
42 Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty, p. 362, including n. 1. 
43 Ibid., p. 9. 
44 Kenneth Pennington, Pope and Bishops: The Papal Monarchy in the Twelfth and 
Thirteenth Centuries, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984, p. 58. See 
also Watt, The Theory, p. 34. 
45 A. C. Flick, The Decline of the Medieval Church, vol. 1, New York 1930 (excerpt 
in Charles T. Wood (ed.), Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII: State vs. Papacy, 
London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, pp. 13-14). 
46 Carlyle V, p. 337. 
47 Ibid., p. 440. 
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incremental development in the history of ideas.48 In yet more modern times, the 
relatively recent general trend in history of focusing on hitherto largely under-
represented voices has been adopted by some scholars of the medieval papacy, 
yielding, for example, the 1989 volume edited by Christopher Ryan which focuses 
largely on the views of theologians, bishops, cardinals, and the Greeks.49 
Nevertheless, ‘to write…about the medieval papacy without being superficial requires 
a strict limitation of the questions to be discussed’.50 Acknowledging, and 
occasionally drawing from, Ryan’s compendium, the hierocratic theory will be the 
central focus. Following other historians, such as Watt and Wilks, monarchy will be 
construed largely as the relation between the ecclesiastical (principally, the pope) and 
the secular (the emperor and the kings) powers—the two powers within the Church. 
Firstly, though, it is necessary to establish what is meant by ‘the Church’. 
 
3. THE HIEROCRATIC THEORY 
It is not easy to grasp what ‘the Church’ was in the Middle Ages.51 Macy admits that 
in a narrow sense the ecclesiastical hierarchy can be called ‘the Church’, but that this 
does not take in every meaning of the term.52 To an extent, the Church was seen as 
‘the society of the baptised’,53 for baptism was the established initiation rite for 
                                                          
48 ‘The doctrines of the canonists during the classical period were developed step by 
step, not through abrupt innovations’ (A. Stickler, ‘Concerning the Political Theories 
of the Medieval Canonists’, Traditio, vol. 8, 1949-51, p. 455). 
49 C. Ryan (ed.), The Religious Roles of the Papacy: Ideals and Realities, 1150-1300 
Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1989. 
50 R. W. Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages, London: 
Penguin, 1990, p. 91. 
51 Gary Macy, ‘Was there a ‘the Church’ in the Middle Ages?’, Studies in Church 
History, vol. 32, 1996, p. 107. 
52 Ibid., p. 113.  
53 John Van Engen, ‘Faith as a Concept of Order in Medieval Christendom’, in 
Thomas Kselman (ed.), Belief in History: Innovative Approaches to European and 
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people to enter the Church,54 normally as a very young child in the West.55 However, 
Christians in the Greek Church were also baptised, yet they were seen as having 
disobediently broken away from the Church.56 A hard term to define, schism is ‘the 
negation of unity’,57 a rupture of brotherhood (possibly dissension) rather than a 
straightforward difference in faith.58 Nevertheless, like heretics, schismatics are 
outside of the Church. From what would the Latins have thought the Greeks had 
broken-away which made them schismatic, and why was this important?  
 
The answer to these questions come when the nature of baptism is analysed more 
closely. More than simply initiation, it was thought baptism established faith itself. 
On this view, faith was not a conscious act of professing belief in anything,59 but a 
substantial thing (res) which obligated the initiate to be faithful in terms of quasi-legal 
subjection.60 This subjection was quasi-legal perhaps only in the West, a culture 
                                                                                                                                                                      
American Religion, Notre Dame, Indiana and London: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1991, p. 20.  
54 Henri de Lubac, Catholicism, London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 1950, p. 35. 
55 J. D. C, Fisher, Christian Initiation: Baptism in the Medieval West: A Study in the 
Disintegration of the Primitive Rite of Initiation, London: S.P.C.K, 1965, pp. 109, 
111. 
56 See PL 215, 455 (a letter November 1204 to Emperor Baldwin) for Innocent III’s 
explicit statement that the Greeks were schismatic.  
57 S. L. Greenslade, Schism in the Early Church, London: SCM, 1964 (2nd edition), 
pp. 17-18. 
58 Ibid., pp. 18-20. See also James Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979, p. 3. 
59 Augustine, quoted in the monk Gratian’s Decretum (the tremendously important 
and influential canonical collection from c.1140 (although see p. 17, n. 42 of this 
chapter concerning its date)): ‘Paruulum, etsi nondum fides illa, que in credentium 
voluntate consistit, iam tamen ipsius fidei sacramentum fidelem facit, sicut credere 
respondentur, ita etenim fideles uocantur, non rem ipsam mente abnuendo, sed ipsius 
rei sacrementum percipiendo’ (‘Sacramentum fidei, non ipsa fides paruulum facit 
fidelem’. De cons. D. 4. C. 76. Augustine Epistolae 98 ad Bonifacium 9-10: CSEL 
34.531-2 (quoted in Van Engen, ‘Faith as a Concept of Order’, pp. 25, n. 27)). 
60 For the post-baptismal obligation to believe, see the Franciscan theologian John 
Duns Scotus (In Sent. 3. 25. 1 (ed. Lyons 1639; repr. 1968), 7. 1. 499 (cited in Van 
Engen, ‘Faith as a Concept of Order’, p. 27, n. 42)). 
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which, from at least the twelfth century onwards, increasingly construed holiness and 
religion in juridical terms.61 To whom, or to what, were the baptised obligated? 
Baptised Christians were obligated both to Christ and to the Church. 
 
It is readily understandable that Christians should be obligated to Christ, but in what 
way or ways could a baptised Christian be obligated to the Church? The Eucharistic 
controversies of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries provide clues. Berengar 
of Tours (d. 1088) thought Christ is not really present on the altar in his body and 
blood in the Eucharist, but is present figuratively in spirit and power. While 
Berengar’s opinions were not new, his mocking tone meant he was twice forced to 
confess the real presence of Christ on the altar (1050 and 1079). Berengar’s critics 
supported the view that Christ must be really present in the sacrament of the altar. 
Evans mentions that the churchman and theologian Lanfranc (d. 1089), thought 
Berengar erred because he went against ‘auctoritas totius sanctae Ecclesiae’,62 the 
‘consensus fidelium’.63  
 
Berengar attacked Lanfranc for adhering to the opinion of the rabble.64 However, for 
the educated of the Latin West, the rabble did not define the consensus fidelium. Who 
did outline such a faith becomes clearer from Evans’ move from citing the authority 
of ‘totius sanctae Ecclesiae’ to that of the ‘Roman Church’.65 Evans points out that at 
                                                          
61 In the thirteenth century canonisation, for example, became a ‘process’ (Jane 
Sayers, Innocent III: Leader of Europe 1198-1216, Harlow: Longman, 1994, p. 135).  
62 PL 150, 407 (quoted in G. R. Evans, ‘Exegesis and Authority’, in D. Jordan and 
Kent Emery Jr. (eds.), Ad Litteram: Authoritative Texts and their Medieval Readers, 
Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992, p. 95). 
63 Evans, ‘Exegesis and Authority’, p. 95. 
64 Ibid. Evans states that Berengar described Lanfranc as holding the view of 
‘multitudo ineptorum’ against him. 
65 Ibid. 
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Lateran IV, a council called by Innocent III which met in 1215, the Roman Church is 
called ‘mater et magistra ceterarum Ecclesiarum’.66 Innocent III did not think that the 
Roman Church was the only church, or even ‘the Church’, but the authoritative 
teacher of the Universal Church, in effect the head which defines the faith which 
animates the body. This sentiment was expressed by Innocent III in his letter of 
November 1199 to the Patriarch of Constantinople: ‘Ecclesia Romana non est 
universalis Ecclesia, sed pars universalis Ecclesiae, prima videlicet et praecipua, 
veluti caput in corpore’.67 Therefore Innocent regarded the Roman Church as mater, 
magistra, and caput of the Church; it was not the Universal Church itself, but the 
defining authority of what constitutes the Church’s universal faith.  
 
Was this “universal’ authority residing in the Roman Church…vested in the 
community as a whole, in councils, or in the person of the pope’?68 Rousseau 
highlights Innocent’s claims to being, as pope, the bridegroom of the Church, creating 
the offspring of ‘virtues and sound doctrines to help advance the salvation of the 
faithful’.69 On this hierocratic view, then, the pope alone holds this authority and 
plenitude of power (plenitudo potestatis) of the Church.70 This is because the pope 
                                                          
66 This is certainly the case, but not in the place referenced by Evans. According to 
Evans (ibid.), this quotation can be found at PL 217, 714. However, at PL 217, 714 is 
found Book I, headings 24-6 of Innocent III’s work De Contemptu Mundi, written 
prior to his election to the pontifical office when he was Cardinal Lothar of Segni, 
with no sign of the phrase. In fact, two canons of Lateran IV contain the relevant 
phrase: II and V (N. P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. I, 
London: Sheed and Ward, 1990, pp., 233, 236). 
67 PL 214, 763. 
68 Evans, ‘Exegesis and Authority’, pp. 96-7. 
69 Constance M. Rousseau, “Pater urbis et orbis’: Innocent III and His Perspectives on 
Fatherhood’. Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, vol. 37, 1999,  p. 31. Rousseau is citing 
PL 217, 664. 
70 This is a term the meaning of which should hopefully become clearer during the 
course of the dissertation. 
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alone is Vicar of Christ. Innocent III made it this clear in a letter to the King of 
Armenia (December 1199), in which he states that  
‘Ecclesia Romana sedes ejus et sessores ipsius Romani pontifices successores Petri 
et vicarii Jesu Christi, sibi invicem per successivas varietates temporum singulariter 
succedentes, super Ecclesiis omnibus et cunctis Ecclesiarum praelatis imo etiam 
fidelibus universis, a Domino primatum et magistrum acceperunt; vocatis sic caeteris 
in partem sollicitudinis, ut apud eos plenitudo resideat potestatis’.71  
Christ said he would be with his Church until the end of the age.72 While present 
sacramentally and through his Spirit, there is no human, physical presence of Christ is 
left on earth, although such a presence is expedient for the Church.73 For the benefit 
of the Church, Christ left his vicar, who inherits not his general character but his 
‘juridical personality’.74 Before ascertaining what this juridical personality comprised, 
the main argument in favour of the pope alone being the Vicar of Christ must be 
outlined. 
 
The text which underlay the view that the pope alone was the Vicar of Christ was the 
Tu es Petrus text of Matt. 16:16-19 in which Simon-Peter confesses that Jesus is the 
Christ, Jesus responding by naming him Peter, calling him a rock, and giving him the 
keys to the kingdom of heaven. By itself the text could be, and was, understood in 
                                                          
71 PL 214, 779. 
72 ‘I am with you always, to the end of the age’ (Matt. 28:20). 
73 James of Viterbo, On Christian Government, R. W. Dyson (trans. and ed.), 
Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1995, 2. 2, pp. 56-7. James was writing around 
1301-2. 
74 Walter Ullmann, ‘The Medieval Papal Courts as an International Tribunal’, 
Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 11, 1971, p. 359 (reprinted, with the 
original pagination, in Walter Ullmann, The Papacy and Political Ideas in the Middle 
Ages, London: Variorum, 1976). Innocent III in the same letter to the king of the 
Armenians: ‘praeter vitae sanctitatem et miraculorum virtutes, par est in omnibus 
jurisdictio successorum’ (PL 214, 779). 
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many different ways: ‘the ‘Rock’ might be either Christ, or Peter, or Peter’s faith’.75 
Similarly, the keys of v.19 could be variously understood. Nevertheless, from at least 
the Decretum—the twelfth century text (or texts76) which revolutionised canon law—
onwards there gradually developed ‘an explicit recognition that there were two 
different types of authority comprised in the sacerdotal power of the keys: a 
sacramental power to remit sins and a  power of jurisdiction which was necessary for 
the excommunication of a sinner or for the imposition of penance’.77 As for who held 
the keys, Matt. 18:18 depicts all the disciples being granted the same power of 
binding and loosing, a passage which could be developed into a collegiate 
understanding of the inheritance of Christ’s legal personality. However, the 
hierocratic reading of the text stated that Peter was the rock and that the keys were 
given to him—and his successors, the popes—alone. Lothar of Segni, the future 
Innocent III, went far in divorcing exegesis of the Tu es Petrus text from other texts—
such as John chapter 20:23 and Matt. 18:18—which suggested that the power of 
                                                          
75 Brian Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the 
Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism. Leiden: Brill, 1998, p. 24. 
Christ (Augustine, Collectanae in 1 Cor. 1:13 (Divisus est Christus?), in Peter 
Lombard, Sentences. PL 191: 1538A-B, quoted in W. H. Principe, ‘The School 
Theologians’ Views of the Papacy’, in Ryan (ed.), The Religious Roles of the Papacy, 
pp. 55-6, n. 41). Peter (Pope Leo I (440-61) (CCL 138, pp. 10-25), quoted in Karlfried 
Froelich ‘St. Peter, Papal Primacy, and the Exegetical Tradition, 1150-1300’, in Ryan 
(ed.), The Religious Roles of the Papacy, p. 13, n. 30). Peter’s confession (Johannes 
Teutonicus (c.1170-1245), Glossa Ordinaria ad Dist. 19. c.7, quoted in Tierney, 
Foundations, p. 25; also Froelich, ‘St. Peter’, p. 8, n.12: the Eastern equation of the 
rock with the confession). 
76 Anders Winroth has said the Decretum was made in two stages in the twelfth 
century (The Making of Gratian’s Decretum, Cambridge: CUP, 2000, esp. pp. 193-6). 
77 Tierney, Foundations, p. 29. For the thirteenth century, see Innocent IV’s 1246 
encyclical Eger Cui Levia, enforcing the deposition of emperor Frederick II (E. 
Winkelmann, Acta Imperii Inedita, II, Innsbruck 1885, pp. 696-8, in CCS 83, p. 148). 
The distinction between the powers of the keys can be traced back at least to Gratian 
(Dist. 20 dictum Gratiani ante c.1, in Tierney, Foundations, p. 28). 
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binding and loosing was given to Peter and the other disciples.78 When Lothar 
became pope, he set out the view that, at very least, Peter was the second founder of 
the Church.79  
 
Even if the pope alone was the Vicar of Christ, why did the pope’s power have to 
extend to the whole Church? In fact, on the hierocratic view the inheritance of 
Christ’s jurisdiction extends even further than the Church to all humans, based on his 
redeeming act: Christ was God and man. Suffering death on the cross, Christ ‘offered 
Himself as a victim for the redemption of mankind and, overthrowing the enemy of its 
salvation, He snatched it from the shame of servitude to the glory of liberty’.80 
Therefore, Christ was dominus mundi—that is, the ‘human master of the world’81—
because his saving action pertained to each and every human being: ‘he bore for the 
souls of all men’.82 That this was not merely an abstract piece of theology becomes 
clear when Pope Innocent IV mentions this soteriology in a letter (5th March 1245) to 
Guyuk Khan, Emperor of the Tartars. Here Innocent stated Christ ‘left His vicar on 
earth…to lead those in error into the way of truth and gain all men for Him’83 (a 
                                                          
78 De sacro altaris mysterio (written as Cardinal Lothar of Segni, before being elected 
to the papal throne in 1198), 1. VIII De primatu Romani pontificis. PL 217, 778-9. 
79 See Innocent III in a letter to the Patriarch of Constantinople (November 1199): 
‘secundum tamen et secundarium Ecclesiae fundamentum est Petrus’ (PL 214, 759). 
See also a letter of Innocent III’s to the church of Tours (June 1199), PL 214, 625. 
80 First Bull of Pope Innocent IV to the Emperor of the Tartars. Epistolae Saeculi xiii 
e regestis Pontificum Romanorum selectae, t. ii, No. 102. MGH, in C. Dawson (ed.), 
The Mongol Mission Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in 
Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, London: Sheed and 
Ward, 1955, p. 74. 
81 Walter Ullmann, Medieval Papalism, London: Methuen, 1949, p, 136. 
82 Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels, p. 45. Emphasis added. 
83 First Bull of Pope Innocent IV to the Emperor of the Tartars, The Mongol Mission, 
p. 74. 
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similar argument was put to the Greeks at the Second Council of Lyons in 127484). 
Christ had enabled the salvation of all, and his vicar was meant to ensure that this 
saving work was completed by trying to convert the Tartars. Just as Christ’s aim was 
to save all men, his vicar was placed over all men to ensure their salvation. This 
universal authority is the unity of the twofold baptismal obedience to Christ and the 
Church. On earth, one is obedient to both of these authorities unified in the person of 
the pope: as Vicar of Christ, the pope establishes the consensus fidelium which is the 
rationale behind the obligation of the baptised to be obedient to the Church. 
Therefore, one should be obedient to the pope, and all those baptised Christians who 
are not obedient to the pope are outside of the Church.85
 
What was the nature of Christ’s juridical personality? It has already been shown that it 
was universal in scope and intended for the salvation of souls. However, did it 
embrace both the spiritual and the temporal, or just the spiritual? To find out what was 
meant by these terms, the so-called ‘Gelasian doctrine’ can be expounded. Christ’s 
office was divided in a way which was influenced by the work of Pope Gelasius I 
(492-6). Gelasius said Christ governed in the same sort of way as Melchisedech—
both priest and king.86 However, for the continuation of his flock, Christ  
                                                          
84 Canon 2 mentions that the pope is ‘the vicar of Jesus Christ, the successor of Peter, 
the ruler of the universal church, the guide of the Lord’s flock’ (Decrees of the 
Ecumenical Councils, p. 317). The universal—that is, for all human beings—scope of 
papal jurisdiction is implied by the comment that electing a pope is to provide ‘what 
is so useful and necessary for the whole world, a fitting spouse for the church’ (ibid.). 
For why this opinion would have been unacceptable for the Greeks, see Doran, ‘Rites 
and Wrongs’, p. 144.  
85 See Boniface VIII’s bull Unam Sanctam, couched in abstract terms, although issued 
at the height of a crisis between the papacy and the French nobility (November 1302): 
‘Porro subesse Romano Pontifici omni humanae creaturae declaramus, dicimus, 
diffinimus et pronunciamus omnino esse de necessitate salutis’ (Corpus Iuris 
Canonici, vol. 2, E. Friedberg (ed.), Leipzig 1881, col. 1246). 
86 An Old Testament figure who was both priest and king (Ps. 109 (110): 4). 
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‘distinguished between the offices of both powers according to their own proper 
activities and separate dignities...so that Christian emperors would need priests for 
attaining eternal life and priests would avail themselves of imperial regulations in the 
conduct of temporal affairs’.87
Gelasius made clear that there were spiritual things (such as administering the 
sacraments, excommunicating people, caring for the souls of the flock of believers) 
and temporal things (such as collecting money, killing people, waging war), as well as 
dual jurisdictions—the priestly and the kingly—to deal with these two different kinds 
of things. Even if ‘spiritual’ and ‘temporal’ were later extended to the non-Christian 
world,88 originally the Gelasian distinction between spiritual and temporal powers had 
most relevance to Christian society. In its practical, working sense, this often 
amounted to Western Christendom, the ‘assemblage de pays incorporés soit par 
conquête progressive soit par décision de souverain’,89 identified with ‘l’Europe’.90  
 
For all ‘Gelasianism’ divided the powers of the juridical personality of Christ between 
two people, another trend of Middle Ages kept these powers unified in one person, 
what Ladner calls the ‘Carolingian’ trend,91 so-called because it has been historically 
attributed in the West to the Carolingian kings from Charlemagne in the ninth century 
                                                          
87 Gelasius on the bond of anathema: E. Schwartz (ed.), Publizistische Sammlungen 
zum Acacianischen Schisma, (‘Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Abteilung’. Neue Folge X, Munich 1934), 
p. 14, in CCS 4, p. 14). 
88 Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels, p. 14. 
89 Gabriel Le Bras, Institutions ecclésiastiques de la chrétiénté médiévale 
Préliminaires et Ire partie 1. Augustin Fliche et Victor Martin (eds.), Histoire de 
l’Église 12. i , Paris: Bloud and Gay, 1959, pp. 22-3. 
90 Ibid., p. 23. 
91 Gerhart B. Ladner, ‘The Concepts of ‘Ecclesia’ and  ‘Christianitas’ and their 
Relation to the Idea of Papal ‘Plenitudo Potestatis’ from Gregory VII to Boniface 
VIII’, Miscellanea historicae pontificiae, vol. 18, 1954, pp. 55-6, 59, 69-73, 75. 
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onwards.92 On this view, the emperor is God’s viceregent on earth, channelling the 
divine will of God,93 legislating on matters both religious and secular.94 However, 
from the time of Gregory VII (1073-85), the unification of the powers in one 
person—or at least sole headship of Christian society—was claimed for the papacy as 
well as for the emperor. From at least Innocent III popes regularly referred to 
themselves as sole Vicar of Christ.95 During the thirteenth century,96 the language of 
Christendom was increasingly connected with the corpus christi which is the 
Church.97 If the Church is Christ’s body, it must have one head, not two: ‘How could 
unum corpus have duo capita?’98 Two heads would be monstrous.99 Against both 
thoroughgoing Gelasianism and the conception of the emperor as alone Vicar of 
Christ, only the pope—on the hierocratic view—could be the head of the body which 
is the Church, for he alone is the successor of Peter. 
 
If Christ governed as priest and king, and given that this legal personality was passed 
on to Peter and his successors (the popes), and because the hierocratic theory says this 
jurisdiction cannot be separated, did the popes wield both priestly (spiritual) and 
kingly (temporal) power? Matters are made more complicated by the notion of the 
                                                          
92 Walter Ullmann, A History of Political Thought: The Middle Ages, 
Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1965, p. 69. 
93 Walter Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages, London: 
Methuen, 1955, p. 107. 
94 Ibid., p. 108. 
95 Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty, p. 354. 
96 See Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, Gemma Simmonds (trans.), London: SCM, 
2006, passim, esp., p. 107 for the thirteenth century. 
97 I Cor. 6: 16; 12:12, 27; Eph. 4: 16, 25; 5: 30; Col. 2: 19. 
98 Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty, p. 77. 
99 ‘Igitur ecclesiae unius et unicae unum corpus, unum caput, non duo capita, quasi 
monstrum’ (Boniface VIII, Unam Sanctam, in Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 2, col. 
1245). 
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two swords. Originally a biblical image,100 its place in medieval political thought 
stems from the eleventh century, originally referring to the two ways in which 
somebody could be punished (spiritually by excommunication or interdict, or 
temporally by torture, maiming, or death101). By the end of the twelfth century the 
two swords imagery was mostly being used as an exposition of the Gelasian doctrine 
which was capable of more nuances (as shall be seen): the two swords were symbols 
of the two Gelasian powers.102  
 
Even with the complication of the swords, if Christ was priest and king, should not 
the pope as his vicar have both swords? In the encyclical letter Eger Cui Levia, issued 
in 1246 in order to enforce the deposition of Emperor Frederick II, Innocent IV puts 
forward the notion that the Church has both swords and gives the material sword to 
the emperor for the protection of the Church.103 Importantly, this sword can be 
retracted, which is a metaphor for the deposition of the secular ruler. The pope, then, 
creates an emperor who is thought to be a suitable candidate for the protection of the 
                                                          
100 ‘They [the disciples] said, ‘Lord, look, here are two swords’. He replied, ‘It is 
enough’’ (Luke 22:38). 
101 ‘poiché sia il gladius come la potestas gladii appaiono mezzi di repressione, 
coazione, soppressione violenta materialae di uomini criminali, strumento di una 
coercitio che può andare fino in fondo, fino all’annientamento cioè del facinoroso, 
fino all’uccisione’ (A. Stickler, ‘Il ‘Gladius’ Nel Registro di Gregorio VII’, Studi 
Gregoriani, vol. 3, 1948, p. 83). 
102 Late in the twelfth century, the canonist Huguccio (c.1188) shows that this 
conferral of authority in the crowning of the emperor by the pope was seen as giving 
the emperor his ‘sword’. Huguccio himself did not agree with this view, but he states 
that ‘Ego autem credo quod imperator potestatem gladii et dignitatem imperialem 
habet non ab apostolico, set a principibus et populo per electionem’. This text is 
quoted in Watt (The Theory, p. 23). Sadly, Watt does not reference this quotation. 
However, a French translation is found in La Théocratie, XV D, p. 254. Pacaut uses 
Vatican MS C. 114, fol. 1-340 for Huguccio’s Summa. The place within the Summa is 
D. XCVI. Pacaut’s French translation is as follows: ‘je dis que l’empereur tient le 
pouvoir du glaive et la dignité impériale non pas du pape, mais des princes et du 
peuple par l’élection’. 
103 Eger Cui Levia, in CCS 83, pp. 148-9. 
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Church—the conferral of authority taking place in the crowning of the emperor by the 
pope—and he could take away this power (removing the sword is something which 
will be discussed shortly). Watt says this notion is found in Innocent III’s (1202) 
decretal Venerabilem (Innocent puts forward the view that the pope is able to choose a 
suitable imperial candidate to protect the Church),104 but there is no mention of a 
sword. The sword is an important detail, for by it was implied all temporal power. It 
could be objected that the sword is given only to the emperor, not to all the other 
kings, some of whom considered themselves outside of the empire (Spain),105 others 
being born into dynasties (France). In the decretal Per Venerabilem, Innocent III 
mentions that Philip Augustus, King of France, thought he had no temporal 
superior.106 Innocent III makes no further comment, but Innocent IV states that while 
this is the case de facto, de iure the pope is the King’s temporal superior.107 Should it 
be objected that the papacy had rights to the imperium alone, this word imperium was 
not univocal.108 While it could refer to the emperor alone or the empire (this itself was 
an elusive concept),109 an etymological strand connected the empire to all legitimate 
                                                          
104 Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 2, col. 80.  
105 ‘Sic enim regimen mundi, excepto regimine hyspanie, translatum est ad 
teutonicos’ (a margin comment, attributed by Gaines Post to Vincentius Hispanus 
c.1234, in the gloss of Johannes Teutonicus on the decretal Venerabilem in Innocent 
III’s Compilatio Tertia. Paris, BN, MS. lat. 12542, fol. 21. Quoted in Gaines Post, 
“Blessed Lady Spain’—Vincentius Hispanus and Spanish National Imperialism in the 
Thirteenth Century’, Speculum, vol. 29, 1954, p. 205). 
106 ‘Insuper quum rex [of France] superiorem in temporalibus minime recognoscat, 
sine iuris alterius laesione in eo se iurisdictioni nostrae subiicere potuit et subiecit’ 
(Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 2, col. 715). 
107 ‘de facto, nam de iure subest imperatori romano, ut quidam dicunt. Nos contra, 
imo papae’ (Innocent IV, In Quinque Libros Decretalium, Venice 1610, 4. 17. 13, col. 
574).  
108 James Muldoon, ‘Extra ecclesiam non est imperium: The Canonists and the 
Legitimacy of Secular Power’, Studia Gratiana, Vol. 9, 1966, p. 557 (reprinted, with 
original pagination, in James Muldoon, Canon Law, the Expansion of Europe, and 
World Order, Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum 1998).  
109 Ibid., p. 558. 
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temporal power ‘by implication’.110 Thus the giving of the material sword may well 
have been a symbol of the pope being the de iure holder of all temporal power. On 
this view, secular rulers held their rule by the pope’s will, the pope being able to 
depose them should they fail in performing their function of protecting the Church 
and upholding justice.  
 
Certainly, other adherents to the hierocratic theory equated the ‘material’ (or 
‘temporal’) sword with all legitimate temporal power. Boniface VIII made this 
connection in Unam Sanctam, stating there are two swords, both held by the Church, 
although the ‘temporal’ sword is held for the Church by secular authorities (kings and 
soldiers).111 It is implied by Boniface that the swords were more than coercive 
measures because he states: ‘Oportet autem gladium esse sub gladio, et temporalem 
auctoritatem spirituali subiici potestati’.112 How could one coercive force be under the 
other? ‘Swords’, then, should be taken as ‘powers’. Boniface VIII’s publicists thought 
along similar lines. Giles of Rome stated that ‘the Church possess both swords’, 
although ‘only one sword was drawn’,113 the other one being given to the secular 
powers.114 The material sword is legitimate temporal power, and ‘every power which 
is in the Church Militant is derived from the Supreme Pontiff’.115 Elsewhere Giles 
claims ‘The disciples…possessed both swords, and [so] the Church possesses both 
                                                          
110 Ibid., p. 561. 
111 Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 2, col. 1245. 
112 Ibid.  
113 Giles of Rome, On Ecclesiastical Power, R. W. Dyson (trans. and ed.), 
Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1995,  2. 4. 8, p. 51. James of Viterbo (On Christian 
Government, 2. 11, p. 131) makes it clear that every legitimate power (given by God) 
is given via the pope’s power.  
114 Giles of Rome, On Ecclesiastical Power, 2. 4. 9, p. 52. 
115 Ibid., 3. 3. 3, pp. 153-4. 
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swords’.116 McIlwain, commenting on Giles’ treatise, wrote ‘the Church, that is the 
Pope’,117 but the above quotation calls the equation Church = Roman Church = Pope 
into question. However, it is not clear how persons other than the pope could have 
created secular rulers. Giles’ reference to the disciples might be a stylistic slip on his 
part, which is hinted at by Giles stating at the end of his treatise that the pope is ‘the 
embodiment of’ the Church,118 and earlier that all legitimate power derives from the 
Vicar of God (the pope).119  
 
If, then, the hierocratic theory’s notion—that the pope as Vicar of Christ created 
legitimate temporal power—is accepted, ‘the pope had a supreme authority in 
temporal affairs…because of the authority inherent in the papal office itself’.120 
Normally temporal matters are under the jurisdiction of secular rulers.121 
Nevertheless, occasionally the pope can intervene in this sphere by his plenitudo 
potestatis. An example of the pope acting directly in the temporal sphere is in 
legitimating bastards. Legitimisation could be seen as a ‘spiritual’ act,122 but, as shall 
be seen, it was seen by Innocent III as belonging normally to the jurisdiction of the 
secular authority.123 In 1204, Innocent III sent the decretal Per Venerabilem to Count 
William of Montpellier in response to the latter’s request that the pope legitimise his 
bastards. Innocent stated that normally such requests should be given to secular 
                                                          
116 Ibid., 2. 4. 7, p. 51. Emphasis added. Cf. ibid., 3. 3. 1, p. 153: ‘the Supreme Pontiff 
possesses both swords’. 
117 McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought, p. 254. 
118 Giles of Rome, On Ecclesiastical Power, 3. 12. 10, p. 206. 
119 Ibid. 3. 2. 14, p. 150. 
120 William D. McCready, ‘Papal Plenitudo Potestatis and the Source of Temporal 
Authority in Late Medieval Papal Hierocratic Theory’, Speculum, vol. 48, 1973, p. 
655.  
121 Ibid., p. 656. 
122 Jane Sayers, Papal Judges Delegate in the Province of Canterbury: 1198-1254. 
Oxford: OUP, 1971, pp. 208-9. 
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temporal superiors, implying that this is a temporal matter; in William’s case, he 
should appeal to Philip Augustus. William had been encouraged to appeal to the pope 
by Philip’s recent success in receiving legitimation for his bastards. However, 
according to Innocent, normally the jurisdiction is split between the pope and secular 
leaders, but occasionally, on the inspection of certain causes for difficult or 
ambiguous cases, the pope can intervene in the temporal.124 As Tierney has pointed 
out, there is no mention of the pope acting ‘indirectly’ in the temporal.125 The 
implication is, then, that the pope has de iure power to intervene in the temporal, 
although he delegates regular jurisdiction to secular rulers to facilitate a more 
practical administration. This is the view found later in the century. Thus Hostiensis 
claimed that, although normally the temporal is overseen by secular rulers,126 the 
pope is the ‘one lord of spiritualities and temporalities’ with two keys, ‘one which 
opens and closes, binds and looses in spiritual affairs, the other which is used in 
temporal affairs’.127 Even more than the canonists, the publicists built on Innocentian 
hierocratic foundations. Again, while acknowledging that regular administration of 
the temporal is the responsibility of secular rulers,128 ‘the Church’, Giles states, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
123 Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 2, col. 714. 
124 ‘quod non solum in ecclesiae patrimonio, super quo plenam in temporalibus 
gerimus potestatem, verum etiam in aliis regionibus, certis causis inspectis, 
temporalem jurisdictionem causaliter exercemus’ (Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 2, col. 
716). 
125 Brian Tierney, ‘The Continuity of Papal Political Theory in the Thirteenth 
Century: Some Methodological Considerations’, Medieval Studies, vol. 27, 1965, p. 
237 (reprinted, with original pagination, in Brian Tierney, Church Law and 
Constitutional Thought in the Middle Ages, London: Variorum, 1979). 
126 Hostiensis, Decretales, 4. 17. 13, Per Venerabilem. Summa Domini Henrici 
Cardinalis Hostiensis, Lyons 1537, fol. 215-16, in CCS 87, p. 156. 
127 Ibid., p. 157. 
128 Giles of Rome, On Ecclesiastical Power, 2. 13. 12, p. 110. 
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‘always has a superior and primary jurisdiction directly over temporal things…’, a 
view which is echoed by James of Viterbo.129  
 
The hierocratic theory can be summarised in the following sentences. Each member 
of the society of the baptised which is the Church has an obligation in virtue of their 
baptism to obey Christ. As Christ is no longer physically present, and because the 
increasingly juridical Church needed somebody with his authoritative and legal 
powers to direct it towards its goal of salvation, Christ left his vicar to represent him 
on earth. The Vicar of Christ—the pope, on the hierocratic view—has the lord’s legal 
personality and thus should be obeyed in the same way as one would obey Christ. 
Spiritual and temporal supremacy are elements of Christ’s legal personality, held by 
the pope for the cure of souls. Using his spiritual power, the pope oversees such 
matters as the sacraments and ensures that the correct prelates are in office. As for his 
temporal power, the pope loans out the material sword to the emperor, kings, and 
princes, permitting them their authority, power, and jurisdiction in order to protect the 
Church within from dissenters and without from infidels. Where temporal powers fail 
to perform this function or no secular temporal superior can be found, the pope has 
the right to overstep the normal jurisdictions to act directly in the temporal by his 
plenitudo potestatis in order that justice should be upheld. This, then, is the hierocratic 
theory, which became dominant from at least the middle of the thirteenth century—
possibly earlier—until its end. 
 
                                                          
129 Ibid., 3. 7. 4, pp. 176-7. Also, see James of Viterbo: ‘The Vicar of Christ is…said 
to have fulness of power…priestly and royal, spiritual and temporal’ (On Christian 
Government, 2. 11, p. 131). The pope’s power ‘can act both through the agency of 
other powers and without their agency when it appears expedient’ (ibid., p. 132). 
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4. THE EPISTEMOLOGICALLY-DETERMINING QUALITY OF PAPAL 
MONARCHY 
Having outlined the view that the hierocratic theory was dominant in the thirteenth 
century in section two and the hierocratic theory’s content in section three of this 
chapter, the hierocratic theory still has to be linked more closely with the popular 
notion of paradigm. At the start of section two it was mentioned that papal monarchy 
had affinity to the paradigm concept for a number of reasons, one being the sense of 
epistemological determinacy associated with the dominance of the theory. To an 
extent this angle has already been covered in noting the disjunctive change which is 
said to have occurred in the middle of the thirteenth century when the hierocratic 
theory was ‘systematised’ and achieved dominance. Nevertheless, its subsequent 
dominance could have been restricted merely to canonists or a handful of 
intellectuals. However, an argument could be made to extend the dominance of the 
theory to the rest of Christendom. This could be done by seeing the hierocratic 
conception of papal monarchy as an article of faith. Certainly the Tartar Mongols 
openly rejected this papalist conception of papal monarchy when it was put to them. 
The Khan’s reply to the letters mentioned earlier130 was unequivocal: ‘come in person 
to serve us’.131 Lands invaded by the Mongols had been overrun because they had not 
adhered to the Khans, and ‘Who could do this contrary to the command of God?’132—
Guyuk Khan, like Innocent IV, clearly thought of himself as viceregent of God on 
earth. The Khan’s reply placed the Mongols firmly outside of the Church. Indeed, 
Boniface VIII said in the bull Unam Sanctam that obedience to the pope was a 
                                                          
130 See p. 18 of this chapter. 
131 Letter in The Mongol Mission, pp. 85-6. 
132 Ibid., p. 86. 
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necessary condition for remaining inside the Church, the ark of salvation.133 
Arguably, it could be said that faith is a necessary condition for salvation (whether it 
is sufficient is highly debatable). Papal monarchy, then, was elevated to an article of 
faith.  
 
Those with faith must ‘believe whatever the church believes’,134 even if reality 
appeared to the contrary. It was thought that if an ‘average Christian’ sincerely 
believed that the Church taught that the Trinity comprised three different gods, then 
this was pardonable, for they really believed what the Church believed but did not 
have the language to express such convictions.135 Now, the popes themselves, at least 
the Innocents III and IV and Boniface VIII, are said to have been adherents to, and 
shapers of, the hierocratic conception of papal monarchy. If the faith, which is 
universal throughout the Church,136 is defined by the pope and the pope is a hierocrat, 
then all the faithful are hierocrats. In the Church, therefore, the hierocratic conception 
                                                          
133 ‘Una nempe fuit diluvi tempore arca Noe, unam ecclesiam praefigurans’ (Corpus 
Iuris Canonici, vol. 2, col. 1245). For this view being found as early as Innocent III, 
see Walter Ullmann, ‘The Significance of Innocent III’s Decretal Vergentis’, Etudes 
d’histoire du droit canoniques dédiées à Gabriel le Bras, Paris Sirey 1965, p. 738 
(reprinted, with original pagination, in Ullmann, The Papacy and Political Ideas). 
134 Van Engen, ‘Faith as a Concept of Order’, p. 41. Van Engen (ibid., p. 65, n. 121) 
quotes the theologian William of Auxerre (d.1231): ‘Credere autem implicite est 
credere in hoc universali: quicquid credit ecclesia, credere esse uerum’ (Summa Aurea 
3.12.5, Spicilegium Bonaventuriam 18A (Paris-Grottaferrata 1986), p. 212). See also 
John Van Engen, ‘The Christian Middle Ages as an Historiographical Problem’, The 
American Historical Review, vol. 91, 1986, p. 545 (reprinted, with original 
pagination, in John Van Engen, Religion in the History of the Medieval West, 
Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2004).  
135 Van Engen, ‘Faith as a Concept of Order’, p. 43. Van Engen (ibid., p. 65, n. 124) 
quotes Hostiensis in support of this view: ‘Sed quid prodest laicis fides implicita? 
Respondeo, si talis ratione motus dicat quod pater filio maior est uel quod tres persone 
sunt res distantes a se adinuicem uel aliquid aliud simile, dummodo sic credat quia 
credit ecclesiam sic credere, et suam opinionem fidei ecclesie supponat, nec suum 
defendat errorem sed paratus sit credere sicut credit ecclesia catholica, nunquam 
hereticus iudicatur…’ (Commentaria, Venice 1581; repr. 1965, 1. 5).  
136 Evans, ‘Exegesis and Authority’, pp. 95-7. 
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of papal monarchy was dominant and hence a paradigm. The view that one 
understanding of the papacy was found in the thirteenth century has appealed to 
modern historians. ‘Faith in the divinity of the papacy as a governmental 
institution’,137 Ullmann said, was ‘taken for granted and was a self-evident condition 
and basis of private and public life’.138 This creates the sense of a homogeneous mass 
of Christians adhering to one view of the papacy in the thirteenth century.139 Hence 
the hierocratic theory again resembles the popular notion of ‘paradigm’, for the 
former, as an article of faith, appears to have been acting like the latter in the sense of 
‘determin[ing] large areas of experience’ as a ‘self-evident condition and basis of 
private and public life’.140 Just as science is embedded in the modern way of looking 
at the world due to the success and reliance upon science today and science being 
taught in school, reflections on the papacy was embedded in the culture of Western 
Christendom in the thirteenth century.   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The popular understanding of the paradigm concept is of a dominant theory and/or 
way of doing things that somehow determines the way in which things are seen 
(‘world-view’) for the duration of its dominance. This fits in well with the modern 
historical construct of the hierocratic theory as the major regnant theory dominating 
thirteenth century understanding of papal monarchy. The view shared by popes from 
Innocent III to Boniface was not just ‘une doctrine’, but also ‘une conception du 
                                                          
137 Ullmann, ‘The Medieval Papal Courts’, p. 361. See also Walter Ullmann, 
Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, London: Methuen, 1966, p. 
95. 
138 Ullmann, ‘The Medieval Papal Courts’, p. 361.  
139 Le Bras, Institutions ecclésiastiques, p. 329. 
140 ‘determin[ing]…’ (SSR, p. 129). ‘self-evident…’ (Ullmann, ‘The Medieval Papal 
Courts’, p. 361). 
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monde’,141 the Weltanschauung of a paradigm.142 The hierocratic theory’s dominance 
was not only among the intellectuals, but among the whole community of the faithful 
because of a property of ‘faith’ itself. The epistemologically-determining aspect of 
paradigms finds a correlate in notion that the hierocratic theory was part of a 
universal, uniform faith throughout the whole of the Church, where the Church is 
identified with the Western Church. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
141 H.-X. Arquillière, L’Augustinisme Politique, Paris: Vrin, 1972 (2nd edition), p. 35. 
142 Shapere, ‘The Paradigm Concept’, p. 707. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE COHERENCE OF THE HIEROCRATIC THEORY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The close match between the paradigm concept and the notion of papal monarchy in 
the thirteenth century depends on how the paradigm concept is understood and on the 
validity of the hierocratic theory. The latter is the subject for analysis in this chapter. 
To do this, the important dispute at the end of the thirteenth century between Boniface 
VIII and Philip the Fair, King of France, will be used as a case study to highlight how 
much the notion of the hierocratic theory smoothes over differences in order to 
present a picture of greater uniformity than actually existed. Firstly, the dispute will 
be outlined. Details from this picture of events will then be used as starting-points for 
discussions pertaining to key issues raised by the hierocratic theory described in 
Chapter One. 
 
2. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN BONIFACE VIII AND PHILIP THE FAIR 
Problems began on the issue of clerical taxation in France and in England. In both 
countries the clergy were used to being taxed, usually at a rate of an annual—or 
sometimes more frequent—tenth of their income. The French clergy had been taxed 
in this way for the papally approved war against Aragon in the 1280s. However, in the 
1290s things changed. In 1294 Philip the Fair needed more funds to, according to 
Philip, defend the realm against the English. At the time there was no pope, and so 
Philip took the unprecedented step of calling councils to negotiate a royal tax on the 
clergy. Given that the defence of the realm was perceived to be a necessity, the 
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French clergy consented to the taxation.143 At the same time in England, Edward I 
was trying to tax the English clergy for the same reason (defence of the realm, but 
against the French). The tax levied on the English clergy in 1294 was a massive half. 
Late in 1295 the English clergy consented to another tenth being levied upon them by 
Edward, and in 1296 Philip announced that he was going to ask for another tenth from 
the French clergy. Clericis Laicos was issued (February 1296) by Boniface before 
Philip’s negotiations with the French clergy could commence. Boniface castigated 
those who exercised ‘unlawful’ power over ‘ecclesiastical persons…without obtaining 
authority or license from the Apostolic See’, threatening excommunication and 
deposition for continuing dissent, obedience to the Apostolic See being demanded.144  
 
Concerning the reasons for issuing the bull, Boniface might have thought the kings 
had ‘decided to bypass the pope’  in levying taxes on the clergy,145 something which 
was not canonical.146 This may have been the case, but sometimes—as in 1294—
there simply was not a pope to consult. Alternatively, complaints to the pope from 
French Cistercians and/or from Archbishop of Canterbury Robert Winchelsey from 
around the time Clericis Laicos was issued may have induced Boniface to issue the 
bull.147 Nevertheless, did such appeals merit the bull’s strong tone? A third possible 
reason for the bull’s issuance was that increased taxation—Edward’s late-1295 tax 
was the first in Boniface VIII’s pontificate—meant that the kings envisaged the 
                                                          
143 Jeffrey H. Denton, Philip the Fair and the Ecclesiastical Assemblies of 1294-1295. 
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 81, part 1, 1991, pp. 19, 24.  
144 Clericis Laicos, H. Bettenson (trans.), Documents of the Christian Church, New 
York 1943, pp. 159-63, in CCS 97, p. 175. 
145 J. R. Strayer, The Reign of Philip the Fair, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1980, p. 149. 
146 T. S. R. Boase, Boniface VIII, London: Constable and Co., 1933, p. 132, n. 1. 
147 Jeffrey H. Denton, Robert Winchelsey and the English Crown: 1294-1313. 
Cambridge: CUP, 1980, pp. 91-2. 
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continuation of a war of which the papacy did not approve. Thus perhaps the matter 
was felt sufficiently sinful to justify a strong papal intervention. The reality could 
have been a combination of these factors.  It has been said that the bull was ignored in 
England,148 but it in fact interfered with the king’s financial planning for his war for it 
made the pope the sole judge of instances when clerical taxation was ‘necessary’.149 
As for France, Philip placed an embargo on the export of precious metals (17 August 
1296). This may well have been because Philip was ‘just beginning to tinker with the 
currency’,150 rather than a deliberate slight to the papacy (which the act did affect 
financially), especially as the embargo ‘came almost four months after Boniface had 
ordered publication of the bull (21 April)’.151 Nevertheless, Boniface did take this as a 
slight, sending Ineffabilis amor to, and against, Philip, threatening him with 
excommunication. The French reacted strongly against this bull. The dispute may 
have escalated further were it not for Italian politics forcing Boniface’s hand. 
Boniface had angered the rival Colonna family, including two members who were 
cardinals. As Boniface needed French support against the Colonna, he backed-down 
mid-way through 1297. 
 
Relations between Boniface and Philip were not strained again until 1301 when Philip 
arrested Bernard Saisset, bishop of Pamiers, on suspicion of inciting rebellion in the 
Languedoc region of France. Bernard was a relatively insignificant bishop, who was 
                                                          
148 ‘The bull failed to achieve its purpose. Edward I continued to tax the English 
clergy without papal consent’ (William E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy 
with England to  1327. Studies in Anglo-Papal Relations During the Middle Ages, I, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Medieval Academy of America, 1939, p. 363). 
149 Denton, Robert Winchelsey, pp. 97-9. 
150 Strayer, The Reign, p. 251. 
151 Ibid. 
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alleged to have said relatively insignificant things.152 However, Bernard was in a very 
significant place: the Languedoc, an area which both crown and papacy thought was a 
tinderbox.153 The smallest hint of insurrection prompted Philip to act, and Philip’s 
actions provoked a violent reaction from Boniface due to the region’s fragility.154 
Boniface VIII stated that the arrest of a bishop by a secular ruler violated Church law 
and so sent a number of bulls to Philip in December 1301, including Ausculta fili. 
This accused Philip of usurping Boniface’s rights. As well as accusing Philip of 
usurping papal jurisdiction, Boniface stated that he could deprive Philip of his own for 
his actions.155 Furthermore, Boniface said to Philip: 
‘Quare, fili carissime, nemo tibi suadeat, quod superiorem non habeas et non subsis 
summo jerache ecclesiastice jerarchie, nam desipit qui sic sapit, et pertinaciter hoc 
affirmans convincitur infidelis, nec est intra boni pastoris ovile’.156  
It is time now to see how Boniface’s statement that he was Philip’s superior was 
variously interpreted. 
 
3. THE DISPUTE AND THE HIEROCRATIC THEORY 
 
i)  INTERVENTION IN THE TEMPORAL 
The French clergy and nobility ‘interpreted the combined acts and utterances of 
Boniface as a demand for a direct temporal authority in France’.157 This jurisdiction 
                                                          
152 Ibid., p. 262. 
153 Ibid., p. 260. 
154 Ibid., p. 261. 
155 ‘quos qui acceperit et se denegat accepiss, eis per ingratitudinem est privandius, et 
etiam ille qui permissa vel concessa abubitur potestate, et qui contrarium tibi suadet 
est contrarius veritati’ (Les Registres de Boniface VIII, vol. III, G. A. L. Digard, M. 
Faucon, A. Thomas and R. Fawtier (eds.), Paris 1921 col. 330).  
156 Ibid., col. 329. 
157 McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought, p. 244. 
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had two aspects. One aspect is the view that the French king holds his legitimate 
secular power directly from the pope, a theme which shall be dealt with shortly, but a 
notion which was rejected by the French in the first meeting of the French Estates in 
1302.158 More pertinent, however, is the opinion that will be treated presently: that the 
pope can act directly in the temporal, parodied by individuals close to Philip in Deum 
Time, a forged bull created as an exaggerated summary of Ausculta Fili. This forgery 
made Boniface claim: ‘We want you to know that you are subject to us in 
spiritualities and temporalities’.159  
 
Did Ausculta Fili admit of such an interpretation? Even in recent times there has been 
scholarly difference of opinion concerning what the bull means. Dyson has stated that, 
from the context, Ausculta Fili plausibly was concerned only with the pope’s spiritual 
jurisdiction, the pope acting on reason of sin (ratione peccati).160 The French king had 
handled Saisset badly,161 and it was the pope’s right to deal with this sin. It was 
mentioned in Chapter One that Innocent III thought that the pope can intervene in the 
temporal having examined certain causes, which does not appear ‘indirect’. 
Nevertheless, Innocent III also showed elsewhere in the decretal Novit (issued in 
1204, during a dispute between the kings of England and France) the different, 
although, importantly, not incompatible view that the pope acts in the temporal 
                                                          
158 ‘il est contenu, que du royaume de France, que notre sire li roi et li habitans du 
royaume ont toujours dit estre soubget en temporalité de Dieu tant seulement’ (Letter 
of the Nobles to the Cardinals. In G. Picot (ed.), Documents relatifs aux États 
Generaux et Assemblées réunis sous Philippe le Bel, Paris 1901,VI, in Carlyle V, p. 
389, n. 1). 
159 P. Dupuy, Histoire du différend d’entre le pape Boniface VIII et Philippe le Bel, 
Paris 1655, p. 44, in CCS 101, p. 187. 
160 Dyson (ed.), On Christian Government, xii. 
161 Strayer, The Reign, p. 266. 
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ratione peccati.162 It could be argued that Innocent III thought that the pope can act in 
the temporal ratione peccati, after having examined certain causes. Innocent III’s 
decretal Licet contains a general list of such occasions, while Innocent IV in his 
commentary on this decretal made a more particular list.163 Listing implies a non-
hierocratic respect for the duality of jurisdictions,164 the pope being permitted only on 
a non-regular basis to intervene in the temporal for the good of the Church with 
respect to its corporate telos of salvation. With acting ratione peccati, ‘Nous sommes 
en présence d’une doctrine essentiellement spirituelle’,165 a ‘very different thing from 
an outright theory of universal temporal sovereignty’.166 The pope inherited Christ’s 
juridical personality as universal judge,167 his universal jurisdiction pertaining to sin. 
Whether the sin be related to spiritual or temporal affairs, sin itself is a matter which 
falls within the spiritual sphere. Thus Boniface VIII in Ausculta Fili, perhaps also 
with Clericis Laicos, may well have been referring only to his superiority in spiritual 
affairs where he is universal judge, which includes his right to act in the temporal 
ratione peccati.  
 
However, Strayer has pointed out that Boniface, perhaps deliberately, created 
ambiguity by not adding ‘in spiritual affairs’ to Ausculta Fili’s claim of superiority.168 
                                                          
162 ‘Non enim intendimus iudicare de feudo…sed decernere de peccato’ (Corpus Iuris 
Canonici, vol. 2, col. 243). 
163 Innocent III: ibid., cols. 250-1. Innocent IV: In Quinque, 2. 2. 9, cols. 238-9. 
164 Colin Morris, The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250, 
Oxford: OUP, 1991, p. 433. 
165 H.-X. Arquillière, ‘Origines de la Theorie des Deux Glaives’, Studi Gregoriani, 
vol. 1, 1947, p. 518. Arquillière links acting ratione peccati very closely with the two 
swords imagery (ibid., pp. 517-18).  
166 Geoffrey Barraclough, The Medieval Papacy, London: Thames and Hudson, 1972, 
p. 114. 
167 ‘papa iudex ordiuarius est omnium’ (Innocent IV, In Quinque, 2. 2. 17, Dilecti fili, 
col. 241). 
168 Strayer, The Reign, p. 268. 
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The French, then, could have interpreted Boniface as claiming regular governance of 
the temporal jurisdiction as his right. Nevertheless, positive evidence would need to 
be found to prove Boniface’s intentions with respect to him construing his regular 
jurisdiction as encompassing temporalities. Other statements of his appear to show 
Boniface respected the distinction of jurisdictions. In the bull Unam Sanctam 
Boniface concerns himself with judgement, seemingly of sin.169 Furthermore, in a 
letter to the French Estates Boniface claims explicitly that his jurisdiction in the 
temporal is only ratione peccati.170 Acting ratione peccati would appear to have been 
Boniface VIII’s main justification for intervening in the temporal. However, it has 
been said that acting ratione peccati, such as put forward by Boniface, was ‘a position 
which…the canonists had left far behind in the latter half of the thirteenth century’.171 
To what extent was this the case? Supporting Boniface VIII was Giles of Rome, who 
construed papal jurisdiction in the temporal as ‘primary’, ‘immediate,’ and ‘far more 
ample than is that regular jurisdiction which the secular lord has’.172 ‘Primacy’ and 
‘immediacy’ imply ‘directness’ and that Giles was a hierocrat. James of Viterbo, too, 
stated that the pope can act in the temporal without intermediary,173 and thus 
implicitly directly. While some of Philip’s officials, such as Pierre Dubois, might 
have portrayed Boniface in a bad way to further French ends,174 Boniface’s 
                                                          
169 ‘si deviat terrena potestas, iudicabitur a potestate spirituali; sed, si deviat spiritualis 
minor, a suo superiori; si vero suprema, a solo Deo, non ab homine poterit iudicari’ 
(Unam Sanctam, in Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 2, col. 1246). 
170 ‘the king cannot deny that, like all the faithful, he is subject to us by reason of sin’ 
(Address of Boniface to the ambassadors of the French Estates (June 1302). Dupuy, 
Histoire du différend, pp. 77-9, in CCS 102, p. 188). 
171 McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought, p. 247. 
172 Giles of Rome, On Ecclesiastical Power, 3. 7. 4: Primary (p. 177); immediate 
(ibid.); ‘more ample…’ (ibid.).  
173 James of Viterbo, On Christian Government, 2. 11, p. 132. 
174 J. R. Strayer, ‘The Laicisation of French and English Society in the Thirteenth 
Century’, Speculum, vol. 15, 1940, p. 85. 
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supposedly highly arrogant manner,175 combined with his apparent patronage of these 
publicists,176 could have been interpreted as tacit endorsement of their positions.  
 
Against the publicists, a French Dominican, John of Paris, wrote Tractatus de 
potestate regia et papali (1302) in favour of the French cause. John entertained the 
idea that Christ might have held both temporal and spiritual power, but then drew a 
thoroughgoing Gelasian conclusion that Christ separated the powers.177 As for 
judging in temporal matters, the pope can excommunicate the followers of a negligent 
and/or heretical prince, but he cannot depose the prince for this is the right of the 
people.178 In other words, the pope cannot act directly in the temporal, but only use 
the spiritual power of excommunicating the followers of a wicked or negligent ruler, 
provoking them into overthrowing him. Nevertheless, should it be thought that 
alleged hierocrats thought they could deprive secular rulers of their office, this is not 
altogether obvious. In depriving Sancho II of Portugal of his kingdom (1245), 
Innocent IV stated that he could only deprive a king of the administration of his 
kingdom, not his status as king.179 Sancho appears to have been an incompetent, not a 
bad, king.180 Nevertheless, incompetence itself is a sin when the incompetent has so 
much responsibility; sin should encompass uselessness, not being an entirely separate 
                                                          
175 Flick (excerpt in Wood (ed.), Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII, p. 17). 
176 Dyson, (ed.), On Christian Government, xviii. 
177 ‘popes have pronounced that spiritual and temporal powers are distinct, not 
dependent one on the other, as in D. 10 c. Quoniam idem (D. 10 c. 8), D. 96 c Cum ad 
verum (D. 96 c. 6), c. Duo sunt (D. 96 c. 10)…just as the spiritual power derives 
immediately from God, so does the temporal’ (John of Paris, On Royal and Papal 
Power, J. A. Watt (trans.), Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 
1971, 10, p. 121. See also 14, p. 166). 
178 Ibid., 13, p. 156. 
179 Edward Peters, The Shadow King: Rex Inutilis in Medieval Law and Literature, 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970, p. 156. Peters is discussing the 
decretal Grandi issued by Innocent IV July 24 1245 (see Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 
2, cols. 971-4).  
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category as hinted by Peters.181 Thus Innocent should be seen as inheriting and 
redistributing the administration of the kingdom of Portugal, as acting ratione peccati, 
extraordinarily by his plenitudo potestatis.182 However, Innocent IV also claimed 
jurisdiction over all human beings, including infidels.183 These de iure rights, then, 
must refer to something other than straightforward temporal power. The alternative 
which presents itself is the unlimited spiritual jurisdiction to judge spiritualities and 
temporalities ratione peccati which the pope inherits as Vicar of Christ. From this it 
can be deduced that Innocent IV—at least in his Apparatus—did not conceive of a 
‘direct’, unqualified papal jurisdiction pertaining to the temporal sphere. This finding 
undermines the judgement that the thought of Innocent IV instituted a disjunctive 
change from the view of the prominence among intellectuals of a belief in papal 
indirect action ratione peccati in temporalibus to the ‘dominant hierocratism’, 
characterised by ‘directness’ of papal action in the temporal which was to be found in 
the latter half of the thirteenth century. 
 
That John of Paris could have written what he did militates against seeing the 
hierocratic theory as dominant in the latter half of the thirteenth century. Nevertheless, 
already it has been seen that both Innocent IV and Boniface VIII did mainly construed 
                                                                                                                                                                      
180 Peters, The Shadow King, p. 139. 
181 ‘the general canonist theory that the papal authority to depose or otherwise correct 
temporal rulers extended not only to those guilty of quolibet peccatum but to those 
who were minus utilis as well’ (ibid., p. 159). The text Peters cites to make this 
point—Johannes Teutonicus’ ordinary gloss—appears to subsume ‘uselessness’ under 
the general umbrella of ‘sinfulness’: ‘Sed pro quo peccato potest Imperator deponi? 
Pro quolibet: si est incorrigibilis unde deponitur, si est minus utilis, ut 15 q. 6 alius’ 
(Glo. Ord. D. 40 c. 6 Si papa, ad vv.a fide devius, quoted in Peters, ibid., p. 159, n. 
50). Peters himself (ibid., p. 162) says that Sancho II was ‘guilty of no sin except 
ignorance and inadequacy’.  
182 Ibid., p. 157. 
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papal intervention in the temporal not as direct, but ratione peccati. Such a view can 
even be found in Giles’ own works. Practically, Giles thought the pope had total 
power in the temporal because ‘Giles’ list of occasional or special cases really 
excludes nothing’.184 Was action in such cases, though, a direct jurisdiction, or 
spiritual ratione peccati? For all Giles stated that the pope has a ‘primary’ jurisdiction 
in the temporal, Giles also thought that the pope cannot normally ‘concern himself 
with temporal power’.185 Only ‘according to a special law’, that is, ‘in special 
circumstances’, can the Church (‘the pope’, in this case) act in the temporal.186 In the 
next chapter of his treatise Giles clearly states this law holds that the pope can only 
act in the temporal for spiritual reasons.187 For Giles, then, the pope both does and 
does not have a right to act directly in the temporal. For a political theorist often 
talked of without reserve as a hierocrat, there were tensions in his thought. Either that, 
or the label ‘hierocrat’ constructs artificial barriers and divisions to the understanding 
of writings of the past. 
 
ii) DERIVATION OF THE SECULAR 
How can the pope’s ‘primary’ and ‘immediate’ jurisdiction pertaining to the temporal 
be reconcilable with Giles’ view that the pope should intervene in the temporal only 
for spiritual reasons? Giles may have only been dealing with a de facto, not de iure, 
exposition of papal jurisdiction in the temporal. However, the existence of vocabulary 
such as ‘ought’ implies that Giles was not necessarily thinking in terms of the 
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aforementioned dichotomy. Rather, Giles’ notion of an ‘immediate’ or ‘primary’ 
jurisdiction in the temporal may refer to the derivation of the secular power from the 
papal, and the resultant obligation of the secular rulers to defer to papal mandates and 
act in such a way beneficial to the Church. Indeed, Giles states that ‘the material 
sword receives its power from the Supreme Pontiff, since every power which is in the 
Church Militant is derived from the Supreme Pontiff’.188 This is the second way in 
which the French may have felt Boniface VIII was subordinating secular rule to the 
papacy. While Innocent IV thought that the pope could not deprive rulers of their 
office, he was focusing on the negative, not positive, relation between popes and 
secular rulers. On the positive side of the issue, did hierocrats think the papacy created 
all legitimate temporal power? 
 
This question will be answered initially by remaining with the complaints of the 
French against Boniface VIII. Boniface did not crown any kings, so he could not have 
directly instituted their power this way. Nevertheless, Boniface thought that the 
Church, and ultimately, it could be argued, the pope held both swords and so could 
have had the power to withdraw the sword, taking away a secular ruler’s power.189 
From Unam Sanctam, it is possible that the basis for this view was the pope’s office 
as Vicar of Christ.190 However, Boniface also expresses the opposite opinion. In an 
address to the ambassadors of the French Estates (June 1302), Boniface, perhaps 
being diplomatic, said ‘we know very well that there are two powers ordained by 
God’,191 a phrase of great ambiguity. Furthermore, elsewhere where Boniface had the 
opportunity to elaborate on the nature of, and basis for, the papal origin of legitimate 
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secular power, he did not take it. In crowning Albert of Habsburg as Emperor of the 
Romans (30 April 1303), Boniface claimed that the papacy translated the imperium 
‘de Grecis per Sedem Apostolicam in persona magnifici Caroli in Germanos’,192 
creating him Emperor on Christmas Day 800. This was done to protect the Church; 
Leo III, the pope, did not think that the Greek emperor was doing a sufficiently decent 
job in this respect, so he translated the empire to the Carolingnians. Now, on what 
grounds did the popes claim that they could effect this change? Was it because it was 
thought that all power resided in the papal office on the basis of the pope being the 
Vicar of Christ? What else could have been the ground for this power over the 
imperial office? There was the eighth-century forgery The Donation of 
Constantine.193 In this forgery, Emperor Constantine gave land to Pope Silvester I 
after the latter cured the former of leprosy during his baptism some time between 312 
and 338. True, Boniface VIII did not mention this document in the crowning of 
Albert. Boniface appears to have thought that the land given by Constantine was only 
Rome itself, the Donation justifying the feudal temporal control exercised by the 
papacy there and possibly in the surrounding Papal States.194 Nevertheless, 
antipapalists at the end of the thirteenth century thought the Donation was a 
significant document worth arguing against, both on Boniface’s understanding of it 
concerning the Papal States and on a more far-reaching interpretation.195 What was 
this latter interpretation?—that the donation was of all the empire. Innocent III 
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alluded to this interpretation,196 while Pope Gregory IX used it in a letter (October 
1236) to Emperor Frederick II.197
 
‘Certes, la pape a été gratifié par Constantin de la domination temporelle sur la moitié 
occidentale de l’Empire’,198 but was this Donation limited to the empire, rather than 
being an equivalent to the right to all secular power? Should the donation have been 
the empire alone, and not all legitimate secular power, then this means the papacy had 
a special relationship with the empire, explaining how Innocent IV was able to depose 
Emperor Frederick II at the First Council of Lyons in 1245 for a variety of charges 
(from heresy to negligence),199 while only being able to remove the administrative 
power, not title, of wicked, negligent, or unjust kings. However, it was shown in 
Chapter One that imperium could denote all secular power, especially when identified 
with the material sword.200 It is interesting, then, that an identification of the Donation 
with the material sword can be found in the works of the canonist Huguccio late in the 
twelfth century:  
‘‘d’autres tirent que le pape a l’un et l’autre glaives, à savoir le spirituel et le 
matériel, et que l’empereur tient du pape la puissance du glaive…De même, 
Constantin aurait abandonné le glaive royal au bienheureux Pierre, montrant qu’il 
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n’exerçait pas légitimement le pouvoir du glaive et qu’il ne le possédait pas 
légitimement, puisqu’il ne l’avait pas reçu de l’Eglise…’’201
Huguccio did not agree with this view of things,202 but it shows the extent to which 
the model of the donation could be used as a justification for papal claims over all 
secular rulers, at least Christian ones.  
 
Innocent IV, however, put forward a very different view of the Donation. According 
to Eger Cui Levia (the encyclical sent in 1246 to reinforce the deposition of Frederick 
II), the donation did not confer upon the pope any right he did not have previously. 
Rather than giving any gift to Pope Silvester, Constantine was submitting to him, 
receiving back the material sword from the pope for a legitimate secular rule rather 
than ‘the inordinate tyranny that he had formerly exercised’ before he was baptised.203 
On this view, the pope had all power ‘inherent in the apostolic see naturally and 
potentially beforehand’,204 because there is a history of salvation—symbolised by the 
image of Melchisedech—of which the papacy is a part, going back to Christ and even 
further, into the Old Testament. Priestly and kingly power are inherent in this lineage 
of the agents of salvation, reaching its apex in Christ but carrying on through the pope 
as his Vicar.205 Elsewhere in his Apparatus on Gregory IX’s decretal collection the 
Liber Extra (1234), Innocent IV put forward a different view, holding that the 
donation may only apply to the West: ‘ecclesia non habet Imperium nisi in 
occidentam’.206 Perhaps Innocent IV was not referring to the rights the papacy had 
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over the empire, but to the de facto reality. However, at this time the papacy was in 
control of the Eastern Empire, or significant parts of it, having established the Latin 
Eastern Empire in 1204 when the Fourth Crusade ended in the capture of 
Constantinople from the Greeks. Thus Innocent was outlining the papacy’s de iure 
rights conferred by The Donation of Constantine. Among supposed hierocrats, then, a 
variety of opinion is found concerning The Donation of Constantine and the more 
general issue of the derivation of the secular from the Church, and, more particularly, 
the pope. 
 
iii) THE CARDINALS 
Even if the pope did have de iure rights to all secular power, what is meant by the 
‘pope’? Does the term ‘pope’ refer to just one person, or many people? This is the 
third issue related to the dispute between Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII. The latter 
restricted the meaning of the term to the person of the pope alone. Openly questioning 
the cardinals’ status in this way was a bold move from Boniface, for from the 
Gregorian Reform in the latter half of the eleventh century the term cardinal was 
‘understood as expressing the participation of its bearers in the primacy of Peter’.207  
 
Boniface’s opinion may have been built on purely intellectual considerations. 
Certainly hierocratic logic would point in such a direction: papal power was given to 
the Vicar of Christ, the successor of Peter. Peter alone was the rock upon which the 
Church was built (or, at least, was its second founder after Christ), and so only one 
person could be his successor and inheritor of the juridical personality of Christ. This 
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argument was, in fact, Boniface’s stated justification for his position.208 Nevertheless, 
there is another reason why Boniface could have chosen to limit the papal plenitudo 
potestatis to the person of the pope alone. This has been alluded to already, and it 
concerns the opposition of the Colonna family in Italy to Boniface. Two prominent 
members of this family were cardinals. Furthermore, Zacour mentions that other 
cardinals were going behind Boniface’s back, talking with Philip the Fair.209 Boniface 
would not have wanted to share the fullness of ecclesiastical power with his sworn 
enemies, for it would have considerably weakened his position.  
 
From the point of view of a cardinal, however, a very different understanding of papal 
power can be found. Some years before the dispute between Boniface VIII, the 
Colonna, and the French,  Cardinal Hostiensis, ‘the foremost thirteenth century 
canonist’210 and alleged hierocrat, advocated a collegiate construal of papal headship. 
Hostiensis stated ‘there is only one head, namely the pope…[the] one lord of 
spiritualities and temporalities’.211 The keys (Matt 16:19) and the two swords 
symbolism (Luke 22:38) were employed by Hostiensis to enforce this point.212 From 
these premises Innocent III drew the conclusion that others were called to a part, but 
the pope alone to the fullness, of power.213 In a sense this is what Hostiensis held, but 
in a radically different way. Hostiensis, Watt stated, thought it was fitting, but not 
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necessary, for the pope to consult with the cardinals on an important issue.214 
However, Tierney argues that Hostiensis went much further, seeing the pope and 
bishops together comprising a collegial headship of the Universal Church.215 
Tierney’s view is corroborated by the texts, where collegial headship is expressed in 
terms of the cardinals being members of the body of the pope,216 sharing his plenitude 
of power and a say in the significant issues which affected Christendom.217  
 
Did Hostiensis’ collegiate approach to headship destroy the inner logic of the 
hierocratic theory? Firstly, as has been mentioned, Hostiensis agreed with other 
hierocrats that Christ gave the keys to only one person—Peter—and that the keys are 
inherited by Peter’s successors: the successive popes. ‘Pope’ for Hostiensis, though, 
referred not only to the person called the pope, but also to the cardinals who were part 
of the body of the pope. The language of the body, if taken in a literal or quasi-literal 
fashion, could not be used in one sense (that the pope is the head of the body of the 
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Church) and another (the cardinals are the body of the pope). Concerning the latter, ‘it 
is senseless to suppose that a man could literally be part of another man’s body’.218 
Moreover, the Melchisedech imagery was employed in the hierocratic theory 
deliberately to restrict diffusion of power to more than one person. The plenitude of 
power should reside in the pope, the cardinals being the agents, although sometimes 
consulted by the pope, who implemented papal orders.219 That this is not merely an 
alternative construal of the hierocratic theory but a fundamentally different 
understanding of papal monarchy becomes clear when it is noted that by allowing 
headship to be divided beyond the pope it would become arbitrary to stop the sharing 
of the headship, and therefore plenitudo potestatis, at the cardinals. Hostiensis 
reasoned that the plenitude of power should not reside in the pope alone for, if he 
died, the plenitude of power necessary for the Church to continue would be gone.220 
However, what if the cardinals who shared in this power died as well? Surely, then, 
the power should extend beyond the cardinals to the rest of the Church. By not 
restricting ecclesial headship to one person, Hostiensis was essentially opening the 
door to a completely different conception of papal monarchy.221
   
4. CONCLUSION 
Although it is hard to gauge the personal opinion of Philip the Fair, for he seldom 
spoke publicly for himself,222 criticism from thinkers such as John of Paris—not alone 
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in his critique of extreme claims of papal power—casts doubt on the ‘dominance’ of 
the hierocratic theory of papal monarchy from the latter half of the thirteenth century 
until the end of Boniface VIII’s pontificate, especially as less cogent criticism also 
came from civil lawyers and other tracts from late in the thirteenth century.223 More 
importantly, on aspects of the hierocratic theory no uniformity of opinion can be 
found among the extant writings of alleged hierocratic theorists. The worries of the 
French concerning papal claims amounted to fear of the consequences of a policy 
based on hierocratic premises. However, not thoroughgoing hierocraticism, but only 
half-formed papalist elements, are found in the writings of Boniface VIII. Apparent 
patronage of the publicists by Boniface might indicate his tacit approval of the 
hierocratic theory, highlighting the methodological problem of assigning adherence to 
theories solely on the basis of written sources. Nevertheless, even among the 
publicists it is difficult to pick out one coherent theory, especially one which 
consistently matches the hierocratic theory as created by modern historians. 
Inconsistency is far more noticeable when Boniface VIII is compared to earlier 
hierocrats such as Innocent IV and Hostiensis. The overall impression gained is that 
the papacy was described in increasingly exalted terms as the thirteenth century 
progressed, although this development was neither disjunctive nor uniform, and was 
often in response to conflict, such as against Frederick II and Philip the Fair. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE SECOND EDITION OF SSR AND THE NOTION 
OF PAPAL MONARCHY 
 
a) THE DISCIPLINARY MATRIX 
Maybe the attempt to ascertain a unified theory of papal monarchy in the thirteenth 
century has suffered from equating unity with uniformity. Kuhn rejects this equation 
in the second edition of SSR. Realising SSR needed clarification (Masterman was able 
to count at least twenty-one different uses of ‘paradigm’ in SSR224), Kuhn kept an 
almost entirely unchanged original text, adding a thirty-seven page Postscript.225 In 
this Postscript Kuhn introduced the notion of the Disciplinary Matrix: ‘the entire 
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a 
given community’.226 Within a community, values and beliefs will vary with the 
individual differences of its members. Chemists in the nineteenth century, for 
instance, commonly used the ‘fundamental tools—constant proportion, multiple 
proportion, and combining weights…as a result of Dalton’s atomic theory’,227 
although ‘it was quite possible for chemists…to base their work on these tools and to 
disagree, sometimes vehemently, about the existence of atoms’.228 While the 
metaphysical element of paradigms is ‘shared commitments to such beliefs’,229 there 
is flexibility: ‘the strength of group commitment varies’ concerning these beliefs, 
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‘along the spectrum from heuristic to ontological models’.230 Some chemists, for 
instance, would have believed atoms to have had an ontological reality, while other 
chemists would have regarded atoms only as useful postulates. 
 
If variation is permitted within the community, how is a ‘given community’ defined in 
the first place? Furthermore, how does the ‘Disciplinary Matrix’ relate to the 
paradigm concept? The two questions are related. Kuhn was not interested so much in 
theories, but in what held scientific communities together. Therefore, in his first 
edition Kuhn used the term ‘paradigm’ to pinpoint what is shared by a scientific 
community. However, when it came to defining ‘paradigm’ and ‘community’, Kuhn 
in the Postscript feared circularity: ‘A paradigm is what the members of a scientific 
community share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share 
a paradigm’.231 Instead, Kuhn thought ‘Scientific communities can and should be 
isolated without prior recourse to paradigms’,232 by such methods as ‘attendance at 
special conferences…the distribution of draft manuscripts or galley proofs prior to 
publication, and above all to formal and informal communication networks’.233 As for 
what holds such groups together, the term ‘theory’ is not rejected by Kuhn, but it is 
too narrow to account for all the aspects covered by the Disciplinary Matrix.234 The 
flexibility permitted by the Disciplinary Matrix, Kuhn thought, is better than positing 
a major regnant theory behind or above this Matrix, for such a theoretical monolith 
would govern the community with more rigid rules than all the members of the 
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community could be expected to know and adhere to. In the Postscript, then, the 
Disciplinary Matrix appears to supplant ‘paradigm’. 
 
While the introduction of the Disciplinary Matrix is useful for acknowledging and 
permitting unity without uniformity, it is ‘far from clear what [Kuhn’s] view in the 
‘Postscript’ is’.235 Indeed, some logic is needed to hold Kuhn’s view together. Kuhn 
moved towards jettisoning a body of theory placed above (or behind) the Disciplinary 
Matrix.236 However, on this view the Disciplinary Matrix would not make sense. 
Elements of the Disciplinary Matrix such as symbolic generalisations have to be 
generalisations of something, of a body of theory prior to its sociological working-
out. For example, concerning an element of the Disciplinary Matrix—‘values’—Kuhn 
mentions how,  
‘The man who builds an instrument to determine optical wave lengths must not be 
satisfied with a piece of equipment that merely attributes particular spectral 
lines…he must show, by analysing his apparatus in terms of the established body of 
optical theory, that the numbers his instrument produces are the ones that enter 
theory as wave lengths. If some residual vagueness in the theory or some unanalysed 
component of his apparatus prevents his completing that demonstration, his 
colleagues may well conclude that he has measured nothing at all’.237
Regular values concerning the correct way to create and use optical apparatus derive 
from optical theory. Again, in discussing suggestions by eighteenth-century scientists 
who had failed to apply Newton’s laws to derive the observed motion of the moon to 
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replace the inverse square law with a similar law, Kuhn says that to have done so 
‘would have been to change the paradigm, to define a new puzzle, and not to solve the 
old one’.238 From this it would appear that ‘it is the theory that is doing the job of 
posing problems, providing criteria for selection of data, being articulated, and so 
forth’.239 Enforcing this reading of SSR, Kuhn wrote:  
‘A new theory is always announced together with applications to some concrete 
range of natural phenomena; without them it would not be even a candidate for 
acceptance. After it has been accepted, those same applications or others accompany 
the theory into the textbooks from which the future practitioner will learn his 
trade’.240  
On the back of this quotation, the primacy of theory seems assured. Again, ‘Scientific 
knowledge is embedded in theory and rules; problems are supplied to gain facility in 
their application’.241 In short, the systematic theory is yet more fundamental than the 
Disciplinary Matrix governs, and is shared by, the community which is more 
deserving of the title ‘Global’.242  
 
So far, Kuhn’s notion of the paradigm concept is comprised of the Global Paradigm 
(the underlying body of theory) and the Disciplinary Matrix (the sociological 
expression, and variation, of the same paradigm). Are John of Paris’ and Giles of 
Rome’s different understandings of papal monarchy merely variations on one and the 
same Global Paradigm of papal monarchy, discrepancies between their views 
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attributable to broadly sociological factors and individual differences? Take, for 
example, the two swords imagery. ‘The Church has two swords’ could conjure up in 
the mind the idea that the Church has two sharp, bladed objects. Words have literal 
meanings which vary according to context. Only those with prior linguistic 
expertise—the ability to recognise context given at least implicit prompting in the 
surrounding language—will understand what is being said without a significant 
amount of explanation.243 The first, artefact-based ,understanding of sword pertains to 
the widest linguistic community. The second, power-referring, meaning of sword 
implies a more specialised community with its own linguistic norms. In sharing this 
latter understanding, John of Paris and Giles of Rome, for all their differences, would 
appear to have been communicating within the same system, jointly holding an 
understanding which would have been unintelligible to those without education in this 
area; they were members of the same community of interpretation.244 This mutual 
understanding between John and Giles appears to corroborate McCready’s belief that 
‘Our categorisation of thinkers as either papalist or antipapalist should not be allowed 
to obscure the fact that to a large extent they shared the same world-view’.245 Like 
papalists, antipapalists were ‘Possessed of a spiritualised conception of society 
(society as an ecclesia)’, as is shown by their adoption of two-swords terminology, 
John of Paris’ talk of a Christian commonwealth being further evidence.246 In view of 
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this acceptance, many of the antipapalists were ‘ultimately forced to accept the fact 
that in its main substance much of papal hierocratic theory is undeniable’.247  
 
Does a shared system of vocabulary, for all their differences, show that the respective 
views of John and Giles on papal monarchy were expressions of the same Global 
Paradigm of papal monarchy? Conceptual distinctions need to be made before any 
draw conclusions can be drawn. It is necessary to distinguish between a system which 
is a worldview and ‘a system of intelligibility’.248 The latter is the aforementioned 
community of interpretation, being a member of which facilitates understanding of the 
literal meaning of certain terms used in the group-licensed way according to 
communal norms.249 The swords imagery is part of the system of intelligibility 
concerning papal monarchy.250 As for the worldview, it is a ‘group-licensed way of 
seeing’,251 comprised of shared aims, goals, values, and beliefs about its subject 
matter. ‘Worldview’ is a catch-all term which is the sociological middle-point 
between the Global Paradigm and the individual, essentially the Global Paradigm 
internalised by somebody through the medium of the Disciplinary Matrix as 
internalised by a single person. A worldview includes values, standards, goals, and 
beliefs, all of which admit of variation, although not to the extent that it contradicts 
the fundamentals of the Global Paradigm. Internalisation of the Global Paradigm as a 
worldview allows the community member to recognise and solve problems pertaining 
to the Global Paradigm displayed in forms which pertain to the underlying theory as 
well as extending this theory to tackle problems the member has not yet 
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encountered.252 A worldview-system necessarily incorporates a system of 
intelligibility, but not vice-versa. A system of intelligibility can be the language 
through which adherents to different worldviews communicate.  
 
Why, though, are ‘worldviews’ important? As has been mentioned already, Kuhn’s 
aim was to explain the coherence of scientific communities. While the Disciplinary 
Matrix describes the elements shared by the community, deeper explanations of how 
the members of the community come to hold these elements in common in the first 
place are needed. How do the members of the community come to work together for a 
common purpose, not differing between each other with respect to the fundamentals 
of the Global Paradigm?253 In short, the answer is because the members of the 
community share the same worldview. 
 
A worldview is acquired by working through exemplars. Exemplars are ‘concrete 
problem [usually ‘puzzle’, for Kuhn] solutions’,254 the presence of which does the 
most to determine the ‘community fine-structure of science’.255 The inclined plane, 
the conical pendulum, and Keplerian orbits256 are all exemplars. Exemplars are 
textbook examples, pen-and-paper exercises, and practical experiments which not 
only provide substance to otherwise abstract symbols (a sociologist would not be able 
to understand to what a physics equation referred without having undergone physics 
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training257), but enable the initiate—the potential member of the community—to 
acquire the worldview pertaining to the Global Paradigm which informs the exemplar 
exercises. It is necessary for the initiate to acquire this worldview to become a 
member of the community. In this way, then, a scientific community  
‘consists…of the practitioners of a scientific speciality. Bound together by common 
elements in their education and apprenticeship, they see themselves and are seen by 
others as the men responsible for the pursuit of a set of shared goals, including the 
training of their successors. Such communities are characterised by the relative 
unanimity of the group’s judgement in professional matters. To a remarkable extent 
the members of a given community will have absorbed the same literature and drawn 
similar lessons from it [as shared source materials]’.258
Through identifying attendance at the same conferences, writing for the same 
journals, and peer review of each other’s works, it is possible to identify a community 
from the outside. Nevertheless, Kuhn’s main focus was to account for this 
professional unanimity within such communities. Identical educational initiation 
through engaging with exemplars, entailing the acquisition of the worldview 
pertaining to the Global Paradigm, is Kuhn’s answer. 
 
Kuhn thought the exemplar is the ‘deeper’ of the two senses of paradigm he uses 
(Disciplinary Matrix and the exemplar),259 and vague allusions to the ‘priority’ of 
paradigms to ‘various concepts, laws, theories, and points of view’260 cast doubt on 
the extent to which Kuhn thought theory and rules matter. However, by itself the 
exemplar cannot provide the initiate with the Weltanschauung of the Global 
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Paradigm.261 Without prior knowledge of the laws of physics, a pendulum is merely a 
weight swinging on a piece of string in the air, and a pen and paper exercise is a 
meaningless puzzle. Nevertheless the combination of learned theory and practical 
exemplars do not just give meaning to symbolic phrases such as f=ma, but to how the 
world is. The initiate needs the whole package: the theory—and its attendant symbols, 
phrases, and rules—and its concrete examples. By acknowledging the threefold 
interaction between the Global Paradigm, Disciplinary Matrix, and the exemplar, the 
first and second editions of SSR can be held together. While the first edition 
encouraged advocates of the book to emphasise the regnant theoretical and 
methodological dimensions of the paradigm concept to the exclusion of Kuhn’s 
intended sociological focus, the Postscript brings the sociological dimension to the 
fore almost to the exclusion of the theoretical. Carlo Ginzburg has even seen the 
Postscript as proposing a completely different conception of paradigm.262 In fact, the 
Postscript is simply an over-zealous counterbalancing exercise, one which can 
succeed in holding together the theoretical and sociological through the modifications 
which have been made in this subsection. 
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b) APPLICATION OF KUHNIAN TERMINOLOGY TO PAPAL 
MONARCHY 
 
i) PAPALISTS AND ANTIPAPALISTS 
Deeper investigation of the paradigm concept has shown the fundamental significance 
of the notion of worldviews, as well as the importance of a balance of the communal 
and theoretical in the paradigm concept, insights which should facilitate an 
understanding of the similarities and differences between papalists and antipapalists. 
Returning to John of Paris and Giles of Rome, it has been shown that they appeared to 
share a system of intelligibility. Did they, however, as McCready implied,263 also 
share the worldview of papal monarchy? Certainly their respective understandings of 
papal monarchy differed, but difference per se is not a sufficient reason for rejecting 
grouping them as adherents to one and the same Global Paradigm. Nevertheless, by 
isolating one constituent element of the concept of a worldview—‘goals’—it can be 
argued that John and Giles were not members of the same community, at least not 
pertaining to the worldview of the dominant notion of papal monarchy. ‘Different 
perceptions of fundamentals may exist’, states Church historian Robert Swanson, ‘but 
still permit adherence, no matter how unconvincingly, to the overall system, possibly 
because the differences between discourses do not affect the system’s ultimate 
goals’.264 Similarly, it has been shown that Kuhn expressed the view that 
disagreement was permissible so long as it did not touch upon the theoretical 
fundamentals of the Global Paradigm shared by the community.265 For Kuhn, 
fundamental elements of the Global Paradigm conferred by exemplar-based training 
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include ‘the pursuit of a set of shared goals’266—identical, or very similar, goals must 
be part of the community member’s worldview, of what is conferred by having 
undergone training via the same exemplars. 
 
Given that both Giles and John subscribed to a spiritualised conception of society, 
they would have had a nearly identical goal for this commonwealth: all its members 
should achieve salvation. The fundamental difference between these thinkers concerns 
who they thought should be steering this commonwealth towards its goal, something 
which itself generates goals, such as the king’s wish for total sovereignty in his 
territory, or, on the other hand, the pope’s desire for the universal obedience of the 
faithful to him as the head of Christian society. Giles of Rome stated that this society 
should have one head of spiritualities and temporalities: the pope.267 On the other 
hand, John of Paris thought there should be a dual headship of this society with 
spiritualities pertaining in the main to the pope and temporalities to the king, the 
jurisdictions being kept mutually exclusive.268 It is difficult to see how these differing 
construals of Christian political theory could be merely varying expressions of one 
and the same major regnant theory, for there was open disagreement on important 
points. Therefore, papalists and antipapalists did not share the hierocratic theory, as 
McCready thought,269 but a system of intelligibility and an underlying political 
conviction that there was a spiritualised and, more particularly, Christian society, a 
commonwealth, which needed correct governance in accordance with the will of God.  
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If John and Giles did not have the same worldview, how can their shared system of 
intelligibility be accounted for? Arguably, the two swords imagery was an expression 
both of the political reality of priestly and kingly powers and of the fundamental 
medieval political principle, at least from the ninth century onwards, of duality within 
unity. Medieval politics in general based itself around plurality within unity. Why, 
then, should this duality within unity be interpreted as being an element of the 
particular area of medieval politics of the theory of papal monarchy? This principle of 
duality within unity was obtained not by working through the exemplars of a theory of 
papal monarchy, but from such texts as those canons attributed to Gelasius which 
were part of the Decretum.270 Through the Decretum’s influence, the Gelasian texts 
would have been well established by the thirteenth century. As lectures on the 
Decretum were necessary to become a canonist,271 anyone with canonical training 
would have had the basic Gelasian principle instilled within them, whether they were 
‘papalist’ or otherwise. These Gelasian canons were so well-known that even non-
canonists such as James of Viterbo and John of Paris could freely cite them.272 This 
Gelasianism was interpreted in contradictory ways. James of Viterbo thought that 
although kingly power might have been given to man from God as part of the natural 
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order of the world, a different, more exalted, kind, comes supernaturally from God.273 
This second kind is—as with Melchisedech—found with priestly power in the 
pope.274 John of Paris, on the other hand, thought the priestly and the kingly were 
separate jurisdictions.275 Again, it is found that there was a shared system of 
intelligibility interpreted in contradictory ways: both writers knew approximately 
what was meant by ‘priestly’ and ‘kingly’, but, due to significantly differing goals and 
purposes, construed them in mutually contradictory ways.  
 
ii) UNDERSTANDING PAPALISTS AS A COMMUNITY SHARING A 
WORLDVIEW OF AN INCLUSIVE NOTION OF PAPAL 
MONARCHY 
What, though, of those who could be seen by this inclusive view (that of unity, not 
uniformity) to have been adherents to the hierocratic theory? Were Innocents III and 
IV, Hostiensis, Boniface VIII, the publicists, and others—despite their differences—
adherents to broadly the same notion of papal monarchy and thus paradigm? Kuhn’s 
notion of paradigm permits flexibility on specifics, providing sufficient leeway to 
include a variety of expressions of one and the same Global Paradigm.276 Rather than 
positing disjunctive change from the ‘dualist’ position (the Church does not have both 
swords) of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries to the ‘dominant hierocratism’ of 
the thirteenth, the plurality of views could all have been expressions of the same 
theory. This way other thinkers, such as Huguccio and the two Spaniards Laurentius 
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and Vincentius, often seen as ‘dualists’277 could be included. From the variety of 
opinion, an inclusive ‘papalist’ (in a very broad sense of people who did not write 
against exalted claims of papal monarchy) notion of papal monarchy could be picked 
out: the pope alone (which may include his cardinals) is above secular rulers as head 
of Christian society. The pope is charged with overseeing that all humans achieve 
salvation. For this end, the pope can act in the temporal (either ratione peccati and/or 
occasionally-directly). There will be variations on this theme. For example, Huguccio, 
it would seem, did not think that the pope creates the emperor through crowning him, 
while Innocent III did.278 Arguably, though, a variation such as this is does not 
constitute a conflict concerning fundamentals. 
 
Creating one unified body of theory to which all ‘papalists’ adhered, however, runs 
into problems. In trying to create an inclusive notion of papal monarchy in the 
thirteenth century not only is there a problem in establishing what constitutes the 
theory’s fundamentals, but there is a danger of ignoring the purposes of those thinkers 
who supposedly adhered to this theory. Some thinkers—such as Hostiensis and 
Innocent IV—were canonists, while others were publicists. It is necessary to 
remember that ‘The problems that most interested the canonists were practical rather 
than speculative ones’.279 Hostiensis, for example, was not trying to create an 
alternative theory of papal monarchy, but was dealing with the practical reality of 
papal government in which the cardinals—such as he himself—had a crucially 
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important part to play in papal decision-making. The seemingly theoretical problem 
about what happened to the plenitudo potestatis when the pope died was really a 
practical problem, for who had a right to take charge should there be an emergency in 
between popes? Hostiensis was writing not too many years after a gap of eighteen 
months and fifteen days between Celestine IV and the next pope, Innocent IV. For 
another example, take Innocent IV and Giles of Rome. Innocent IV ‘was a trained 
medieval canonist mind: he was not a ‘publicist’ or a philosopher of the law—an 
Aegidius Romanus [Giles of Rome] looking for a good job—but a serious jurist’.280 
Unlike the publicists’ abstractions,281 the ideas of Innocent IV ‘were hewn out of a 
brutal and sorrowful reign’,282 which included, among numerous other things, the 
drawn-out battle with Frederick II.283 Thus some of Innocent IV’s ideas, such as those 
found in Eger Cui Levia,284 were derived from his practical canonistic mind and the 
practical problems which shaped the direction of canon law. Other, less extreme, 
ideas of his were made in the calmer setting of his Apparatus on the Decretals of 
Gregory IX.285  
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Cantini even thought Eger Cui Levia was written by somebody other than Innocent 
IV, for the views there expressed contradict Innocent’s opinion elsewhere that infidels 
could have legitimate government.286 Given that an inclusivist line concerning what 
could count as adherence to the dominant thirteenth-century theory of papal monarchy 
(which may be still called ‘hierocratic’ in a token way to imply its dominance) is now 
being taken, and also that a lot is known about Innocent IV, this is not too much of a 
problem. However, take Giles of Rome. In his De Ecclesiastica Potestate, Giles 
appears to be a sincere advocate of the papalist position. However, twenty-one years 
previously he wrote De Regimine Principum, written as an instruction manual for the 
young Philip the Fair, including ‘no assertion of ecclesiastical rights and 
prerogatives’.287 The treatises are so different ‘it is often not easy to remember that 
the same author is responsible for both’.288 Furthermore, after serving Boniface VIII, 
Giles went over to write for Philip the Fair. Historically, could it be known whether 
Giles was an adherent to the paradigm of papal monarchy, another paradigm, or none 
at all (if this is possible)? It is not possible. If there was a dominant Global Paradigm 
of Christian government, Giles could not have so freely changed between different 
theories within a relatively short space of time. Paradigms, it would seem, are useful 
mainly for delineating groups in the present. By scanning lists of attendees at 
conferences, people undertaking experiments/conducting research, and taking higher 
degrees in a subject, membership of a scientific community can be ascertained. Some 
of the same uncertainty of adherents to papal monarchy holds true when membership 
of a scientific community is investigated historically. Did person X—in their 70s in 
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the 1950s—adhere to the same paradigm as Y, living in the present day? X was never 
a professional scientist and nothing much was written about or by him as a person 
during his lifetime. Were X living in the present, Y could test his adherence by talking 
to him about science and going through practical experiments. From written sources 
by people no longer living, were there not a good deal of third party contemporary 
evidence nor a personal memory of a person it is highly problematic to say with 
certainty whether a person had a particular worldview or not. 
 
A second point relating to the Global Paradigm concerns using this concept in an 
inclusive way to unite disparate thinkers, seeing them as representatives of a broad 
system. In trying to systematise the works of the lawyers there is a risk of ‘imposing 
on them categories of thought that have little relation to the real sources and content 
of their work’.289 The publicists’ work appears systematic and theoretical in character, 
but problems are encountered when attempts are to made see it as advocating the 
same theory as that of Innocent IV and Hostiensis,290 for the latter two figures did not 
have a systematic theory. McCready seemingly limited the ‘hierocratic theory’ to the 
works of the publicists, although admitting canonical influence upon them.291 It is 
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possible that the publicists influenced some of Boniface VIII’s statements, although 
Boniface never went as far as some of Giles’ or James’ comments. Furthermore, 
Innocent IV and Hostiensis were likely influences on the publicists, but the latter 
picked up on isolated phrases of both of these thinkers and others besides, leaving 
others which did not fit their theses. Therefore the works of Innocent IV and 
Hostiensis should not be seen as part of the same construal of the papacy as those of 
the publicists, but as the occasional indicators—retrospectively—of the direction 
taken later by the publicists. Stickler warned against positing disjunctive change in the 
works of the canonists,292 an insight applicable to the development of thought on 
papal monarchy in general. In the thirteenth century it would seem there was a 
tradition of canonistic thought which was built up by uneven gradual development 
and the separate, but loosely related, later spate of writing by a number of publicists. 
On some points these two sets of writers agreed, on others they disagreed.  
 
Moving on to the issue of papal monarchy in relation to exemplars, how could a 
broad, inclusive, notion of papal monarchy become a worldview for potential 
initiates? Presumably, via exemplars. What candidates for exemplars could be found 
for this even should there actually have been such a theory? Perhaps the papalist 
reading of the Tu es Petrus text, the two swords theory, and the figure of 
Melchisedech could all be included. The problem is that political-religious beliefs and 
opinions are not epistemologically the same as those pertaining to scientific theories. 
If there are political-religious worldviews at all, arguments in favour of these opinions 
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are often put posterior to the worldview as held by someone, whereas for scientific 
disciplines the worldview—something not easily, if at all possibly, shaken—is 
conferred by engaging with exemplars. One chooses to be a scientist, then engages 
with exemplars to obtain the skills to identify, solve, and evaluate solutions to, 
problems in the ways licensed by the community. Admittedly, some people without 
prior political-religious beliefs could be won-around to, say, Innocent III’s position by 
listening to his arguments. Nevertheless, Innocent’s arguments could be accepted on 
the basis of greed, fear, ignorance, or any other factor of this kind, that is, without 
necessarily holding Innocent’s construal of the papal office as a worldview. For 
example, there is the case of Thomas of Marlborough. A monk of the abbey of 
Evesham, Thomas was representing his abbey at the curia to prevent Mauger, bishop 
of Worcester, from obtaining the right to make a visitation of the abbey. At one point 
in this difficult case Thomas wrote that he addressed Innocent III thus: ‘Holy father, 
you have been called to fullness of power, and all things therefore are permitted to 
you’.293 This exalted language may have been sincere on Thomas’ part, or it may not 
have been—it is very hard to tell one way or the other. However, given the 
circumstances it is very probable that Thomas was trying to flatter the pope in order to 
win the case. Indeed, Brundage says that ‘To lie like a lawyer’ was a proverbial 
phrase in the thirteenth century.294
 
On occasions it was not a question of people lying, but of simply not internalising the 
propositions they had learned. One issue raised during disputes between secular 
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masters and mendicants at the university of Paris in 1256 was whether mendicant 
preaching was legitimate. Aquinas argued that the pope, with his plenitude of power, 
could allow new orders to preach in dioceses without permission of their bishops. 
Horst has said ‘No representatives of the secular clergy…denied the authority of the 
pope’, yet ‘The Parisian professors…were not willing to accept the consequences this 
position entailed’.295 Although clearly understanding and accepting papal plenitudo 
potestatis, the doctrine was not part of their worldview, otherwise they would have 
followed the argument through to its conclusion, even if they did not like the 
consequences of doing so, that is, of letting the mendicants preach with the 
permission of the pope, although not from the others bishops. There are external ways 
to test whether somebody is a medical doctor or a physicist, for if they cannot 
recognise, solve, or evaluate problems pertaining to their discipline then they do not 
have the worldview training in that discipline is meant to confer. However, there is no 
way to test conclusively whether the statements expounded by an apparent adherent to 
the notion papal monarchy reflect an interior worldview. 
 
c) A METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
Acknowledging a plurality of views concerning papal monarchy and the possibility 
that people might not have been telling the truth when they spoke or wrote things 
down surely does not matter if the faith of the Church was the same for all the 
faithful? In Chapter One it was shown that even seemingly open contradictions to the 
faith did not matter so long as the person uttering them sincerely wanted to believe 
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what the Church believed. Thus, irrespective of differences, the same notion of papal 
monarchy—whether hierocratic or otherwise—was believed everywhere. Therefore 
there was one dominant notion of papal monarchy, instilled as a worldview in the 
minds of all through their faith in Christ and the Church, with all the faithful working 
together with a common goal of the salvation of all in the Church. How, then, could 
the notion of papal monarchy in the thirteenth century have been anything other than a 
paradigm? 
 
There are two problems with this view. One concerns the nature of paradigms, the 
other pertains to the historiography of belief. On the first difficulty, the investigation 
into Kuhn’s focus on scientific communities casts doubt on the extent, and manner, of 
a paradigm’s determining influence. In the Introduction and Chapter One, allusions to 
paradigm’s determining quality made it appear like an all-embracing cultural 
phenomenon. Shapere’s ‘disciplinary zeitgeist’ could mean apply either to a specialist 
community or to the general public learning how the world works through culture and 
basic formal education.296 This chapter’s look at Kuhn’s Postscript has made it clear 
that he was referring to relatively small professional communities: a paradigm 
determines a person’s thoughts and judgements only after having engaged with 
exemplars in a structured course of study. A worldview, rather than half-understood 
scraps of knowledge, is gained in this way. 
 
Concerning the historiography of belief, it is necessary to understand that assumptions 
of a universal faith were based on a priori, not empirical, arguments. This is implied 
in the analysis in Chapter One based on Unam Sanctam. Obedience to the pope was 
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declared by the pope to be an article of faith, and then it is inferred that all the non-
excommunicated baptised within Christendom must think obedience to the pope is an 
article of faith too. Implicit in ‘obedience’ is acceptance of papal claims (it will be 
shown later that this issue is more complicated). Average Christians, then, have had 
articles of faith—such as of papal monarchy—imposed onto them, and the popes 
themselves did not attempt to ascertain whether the actuality of lived faith 
corresponded to the imposition placed on the faithful. In a letter of 25 February 1204, 
Innocent III asked Joannitsa, leader of the Bulgarians, to ‘confirm your kingdom in 
subjection and devotion to the Apostolic See’.297 While this request could be taken to 
mean that Joannitsa should ensure that everybody was Christian, the word ‘confirm’ 
suggests that all that Innocent required was Joannitsa’s word that his kingdom was 
Christian to convince him that everybody within his kingdom was Christian. In fact, 
for Innocent, even mere conquest itself was deemed to facilitate the conversion of the 
conquered. After the Fourth Crusade ended in the conquest of Constantinople in 1204, 
Innocent III wrote to Baldwin, the Latin Emperor of Constantinople, that the Greeks: 
‘donec a superbis ad humiles, ab inobedientibus ad devotos, a schismaticis ad 
Catholicos justo Dei judicio est translatum’.298
Again, in another letter (30 March 1205, when Innocent III ordained the elect of 
Constantinople), Innocent says of the Greeks that,  
‘although the same church departed from the obedience of the Apostolic See in the 
past…it has humbly returned to her through the grace of God’.299  
The Bulgarians’ leader spoke for all his people—they were not consulted. As for the 
Greeks, mere conquest of baptised Christians appears to have brought Innocent III to 
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298 PL 215, 455.  November 1204 to Emperor Baldwin. 
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regard them henceforth obedient to the Apostolic See, even if this illusion was 
shattered shortly after.300 The point is that Innocent III assumed that a nation’s 
geographical incorporation into Christendom entailed the adherence to the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy’s papalist position (which itself wrongly assumes there was 
only one) in the minds and hearts of each and every member of that nation. 
 
What was the basis for believing that the faith of all within Christendom was 
identical? In Chapter One it was mentioned that baptism obligated the baptised to be 
obedient towards both Christ and the Church.301 What baptism conferred also was the 
predilection to this obedience.302 In other words, baptism conferred the faith itself at 
the minimal level. There was some debate in the thirteenth century concerning 
whether this minimal faith was sufficient for salvation, learning more about the faith 
being one way of ensuring salvation.303 Nevertheless, the will to believe what the 
Church believed conferred by the minimal, substantial faith baptism provided enabled 
there to be a universal faith. The assumption of a single, universal faith, then, was 
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 79
based upon theological, not historical, argument: ‘the Christian faith, like the 
universal Church, exists only as a theological concept’.304
 
Is there any reason to assume that the views of the average Christian on papal 
monarchy were different from those who wrote in complex fashion on papal 
monarchy such as the popes who defined the faith? The access the ‘average’ Christian 
would have had to developed conceptions of papal monarchy has to be taken into 
consideration. Instruction manuals were one of the main ways in which the faith was 
taught to the clergy, although they sometimes filtered down to literate laymen.305 The 
emphasis was not upon instruction in the theory of papal monarchy, but largely on 
preparing clergy to teach on topics such as sin and salvation. These manuals 
proliferated in the wake of the reforming momentum generated by Lateran IV. Up to 
around 1260 the emphasis was upon the priest teaching the laity how to confess their 
sins.306 After 1260, such manuals broadened out to include advice on changing one’s 
character and lifestyle in an attempt to reduce sinfulness in the first place.307 Thus the 
bulk of instruction given to the laity was moral, sacramental, and practical. When the 
laity were taught on more doctrinal aspects of Christianity, they were expected to 
know only the absolute basics of the faith: ‘the Creed, the Paternoster, and the Ave; a 
list often supplemented by adding the Salve Regina in praise of the Virgin’.308 The 
problem with these articles of faith and others besides is that they may have been only 
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memorised, not internalised. There appear to have been examinations on these basics 
of the faith—and perhaps others—of every Christian at the annual confession made 
mandatory by Lateran IV in 1215.309 Such examinations could have been useful for 
teaching the laity about Christian beliefs and practices, or they could have been seen 
as necessary evils to pass with the knowledge one had previously acquired. However, 
the emphasis appears to have been on the aforementioned basics of faith and on 
Christian conduct, more specialist areas such as the notion of papal monarchy were 
unlikely to have been touched upon in any depth, if at all (this was also the case with 
parish visitations310). Furthermore, how the laity reacted to confession (or 
examination) is unknown, nor of how much, or how deeply, it taught the laity about 
Christianity.311  
 
Did sermons given in the thirteenth century instil the worldview of papal monarchy in 
the minds of the average Christians? Probably not, for at least three reasons. Firstly, 
there is a problem with the content of surviving sermons. Secondly, the nature and 
intention of sermons pose difficulties. Thirdly, it is unclear how sermons were 
received. Concerning the first problem, ‘les sermons ne reflètent pas les même 
préoccupations que les oeuvres proprement théologiques ou canoniques’.312 ‘Summus 
pontifex’ and other such generic expressions were by far the most prevalent in 
thirteenth-century sermons.313 Even though the pope as the Vicar of Christ was so 
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important to thirteenth-century thought on papal monarchy, the title does not appear 
frequently in sermons of the period.314 From preaching, too, it would seem as though 
there was a lack of substantial teaching of academic material on papal monarchy to 
the laity by the friars in the thirteenth century (unlike in the fifteenth).315 As for the 
second problem, even if sermons are found containing motifs pertaining to more 
theoretical aspects of thirteenth-century papal monarchy, ‘One is always at least one 
degree removed from the sermon that a congregation would have heard’.316 It is likely 
that ‘sermons’ written in Latin were model sermons centrally distributed to various 
regions.317 In each region, a preacher may well have selected some information from 
the template and not others, interspersing the generic Latin sermon with his own 
material. Furthermore, it is not even clear whether some ‘sermons’ were ever read 
out.318 Moving on to the third difficulty, ‘although the popularity of sermons is 
clear…often there is no concrete evidence, of either audience or reactions’.319 It is not 
always obvious whether the audience for sermons was educated or uneducated. If they 
were the latter, the problem remains of ascertaining the level of understanding of 
papal monarchy among uneducated people, for the degree to which preachers spoke 
over the heads of this audience cannot be determined.  
 
In view of the existence of a gap in knowledge of articles of faith between educated 
and uneducated which in all probability was exceptionally large, does a ‘two-tier’ 
level of understanding have to be posited? Talking of the consequences of the 
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Gregorian Reform of the latter half of the eleventh century, André Vauchez states that 
there was such a society, one of the reasons for which was that clerics had a level of 
access to learning which the laity did not have.320 Historians who have advocated the 
‘two-tier’ approach have not applied it without subtlety. Vauchez recognises that the 
gap between the two cultures grew less in the twelfth century as a result of popular 
religious movements.321 Nevertheless, other historians who have not subscribed to 
this ‘two-tier’ view have pointed out more fundamental binding elements shared 
between the educated and uneducated: 
‘In medieval Christendom, religious culture rested ultimately on ‘faith’ or ‘belief’, 
meaning professed assent to certain propositions as well as inner conviction. Those 
propositions were articulated in the Apostles’ Creed, or, as it was most commonly 
called in medieval Latin, ‘the articles of the faith’, and those articles were binding on 
all alike from peasant to pope’.322
The Creed indeed was a point of contact between educated and uneducated. Was there 
a similar point of contact concerning papal monarchy? Acknowledgement of papal 
primacy may have united the educated and uneducated (the ‘Papa’ or ‘Summus 
pontifex’ of the sermons). Ullmann also thought that knowledge of the Tu es Petrus 
text would have been a common uniting point between all Christians within Western 
Christendom.323 However, the Greeks and John of Paris acknowledged papal primacy 
and knew of this text, but interpreted it in ways not remotely acceptable to papalists of 
the thirteenth century. It is unrealistic to believe with Ullmann that every average 
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Christian would have adhered to the ‘papal interpretation’ of this text,324 for they 
might not even have known it, let alone understood or agreed with it. Therefore, while 
a thoroughgoing ‘two-tier’ model would be inaccurate on concerning some areas of 
the Christian faith in the thirteenth century, to a significant extent it is a helpful 
historical model to portray the reality of the difference between educated and 
uneducated understandings of the papal office. If paradigms are held by communities, 
and acceptance of papal monarchy was seen by the papacy as an article of faith in the 
thirteenth century in the community of Christian believers which was the Church, 
construing acceptance of the broad notion of papal monarch as cognitive propositions 
articulated by thinkers such as Hostiensis and Giles of Rome would have placed the 
vast majority of average Christians outside the Church.  
 
The papacy may well have understood ‘acceptance’ differently in a non-cognitive 
way. According to Unam Sanctam, ‘obedience’ to, not ‘understanding’ of, the pope 
was required.325 Such obedience could be interpreted as ‘tacit faith’ in the notion of 
papal monarchy. Ullmann thinks there was such a tacit faith, the evidence for which 
being that the papacy achieved success without having a permanent army or militia.326 
Away from the purely negative obedience of not attacking the papacy (which is not 
entirely accurate because, periodically, the people of Rome would rise up against the 
pope, as in 1227 when Pope Gregory IX stated that he intended to excommunicate 
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Emperor Frederick II327), there were positive ways in which the average Christian was 
obedient to the papacy. Payment of taxes—tithes (by the laity), tenths (by the clergy), 
and other fiscal burdens—was one way. There were dissenting voices, such as the 
Berkshire Rectors who protested about being taxed for the papal war effort against 
Emperor Frederick II (1240). However, the Rectors’ objection was as much against 
the risk involved in crossing imperial territory when delivering the money as against 
the tax itself.328 For the most part taxes were paid, even if sometimes reluctantly and 
often late.  
 
As well as the payment of taxes, another case of positive obedience to the papacy was 
in using the papal court to arbitrate in disputes. The case of Thomas of Marlborough 
has already been described. Also noteworthy is the case of the bishopric of 
Winchester which fell vacant in the 1230s. Henry III sent for papal approval of the 
translation of William Raleigh from the see of Norwich to that of Winchester. 
Business was conducted slowly, allowing the king to accrue £20, 000 in revenue from 
the vacant see of Winchester. Henry of Susa—the king’s lawyer—became famous and 
more successful as a result of handling the case, contributing to a reputation which 
saw him being made Cardinal-Bishop of Ostia (hence Hostiensis). As the translation 
was eventually approved, Raleigh got his job, the monks of Winchester getting their 
man. Most importantly, ‘the papal primacy had been vindicated’.329 Everything 
worked out because ‘Everyone was happy’.330 The papal system was not a burden on 
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anyone in this situation. For some people then, at least, the papal system of 
government was a way of getting what one wanted. Again, Master Walter, archdeacon 
of Norfolk, won a case (10 June, 1249, at Lyons) heard by a papal auditor against the 
prior and convent of Wymondham concerning visitation rights and ‘exercise of 
archidiaconal jurisdiction in the churches of Wymondham and Happisburgh’.331 
Appeal to the papal auditor was a shrewd move, for Walter was chaplain of Pope 
Innocent IV. It could be presumed that Walter thought loyalty and connections would 
help him with his case.  
 
Not only ecclesiastics, but also the laity could benefit from appeals to papal courts. 
Summer 1200, Otto of Brunswick—an imperial candidate—wanted his seven year old 
daughter Maria to marry Duke Henry of Brabant. Financial and military assistance for 
Otto would have resulted from the marriage. However, by canon law Maria and 
Henry were too closely related, so an appeal was made to Innocent III. At this time, 
Innocent was trying to strengthen Otto’s position, so he granted him a dispensation.332 
In general terms, the papal court offered an alternative to the secular courts; one’s 
case might stand a better chance in one court or in another, and one would choose 
whichever court gave one the best chance.333 Therefore, in some cases at least, 
obedience was not a matter of having a worldview of a certain notion of papal 
monarchy, but of using a system in which everyone tried ‘to make themselves 
comfortable’.334 This system may have disguised mere toleration of, or even 
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resistance, to the papacy. However, so long as people could get what they wanted, the 
system was upheld. 
 
Where the system did not suit, it broke down, as was shown in Chapter Two with the 
case of clerical taxation. The system worked in the 1280s when Philip the Fair 
petitioned Pope Nicholas IV for a grant to tax the French clergy for a war of which 
the pope approved against the Aragonese. When Philip knew that Boniface VIII 
would probably not grant him the privilege for taxation to fund the war against the 
English, perhaps at least for the very fact of it being used for warring, he bypassed the 
pope in 1296. This was not necessarily a rejection of papal authority in the same way 
that Philip’s request to the pope in the 1280s was not necessarily an affirmation of it. 
In the latter circumstance the system suited, in the former it did not. Of course, it was 
better all round if the system could be played, for then egos were not hurt and 
alliances were not broken.  
 
d) CONCLUSION 
Jettisoning uniformity by introducing the Disciplinary Matrix potentially permitted 
understanding a far wider range of popes, theologians, and canonists as adhering to 
the same view of the papacy, so long as they did not conflict over fundamentals. 
Ascertaining what counts as ‘fundamental’ is a problem. Nevertheless, critics of 
Papalism such as John of Paris can be seen as having been outsiders to this hierocratic 
community. Although John—like the hierocrats—construed society in a spiritualised 
way, this was a basic principle of politics in general, not just papal monarchy in 
particular. While both John and the hierocrats had the good of the Christian 
commonwealth as a goal, this was vague enough to accommodate their respective—
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and conflicting—Royalist and Papalist goals. Even within the ranks of the so-called 
hierocrats there are problems in understanding them all as having been part of the 
same community, for the ‘communal’ is the emphasis of Kuhn’s Postscript. Publicists 
clearly borrowed arguments and imagery from the canonists, especially Innocent 
III.335 However, lawyer-popes and canonists wrote for practical purposes and each of 
them would sometimes present different views, sometimes even contradicting 
themselves, depending upon the context. Burdened with less responsibility, the 
publicists attempted to put forward thoroughly abstract and theoretical works. Were it 
possible to overcome the problem of differing purposes, there would remain the 
difficulty of judging who was a hierocrat. The importance of having a worldview 
militates against accepting as Papalist at face value anybody who could repeat 
hierocratic formulas. Unlike in science, there is no adequate way of testing whether 
somebody has got a politico-religious worldview. Recourse should not be had to 
thirteenth-century claims—taken up by some modern historians—that everybody 
within Christendom had faith in the papacy. Such claims were based on a priori 
theological assumptions, not historical evidence. The reality was that the ‘average’ 
Christian probably knew of the pope and that he was an important figure, but this 
basic understanding of the papal office could accommodate Greek or antipapalist 
construals of papal power and authority just as easily as papalists interpretations 
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CONCLUSION 
At first, Kuhn’s paradigm concept appears as a good shorthand for the nature of the 
notion of papal monarchy in the thirteenth century. Either from the time of Innocent 
III or Innocent IV, the hierocratic theory is said by many modern historians to have 
dominated thought on the subject until the end of the century. This hierocratic 
conception of the papacy was meant to have been embedded in culture, determining 
the populace’s way of conceiving the world in a way which conforms to the 
paradigm. A hallmark of the hierocratic theory is understanding the pope as being the 
mediating source between man and God of all legitimate power and authority, secular 
rulers holding and/or being permitted to hold their power from the pope. In view of 
this exalted position as Vicar of Christ, the pope could act directly in the temporal on 
the inspection of certain causes to protect the interests of the Christian 
commonwealth.  
 
Were this understanding of ‘paradigm’ a good match with thirteenth-century papal 
monarchy, it would be beneficial. Kuhn’s fears of ‘paradigm’ being employed outside 
modern science would be unjustified. Furthermore, it would mean a term—
‘paradigm’—would encapsulate not only the dominance of the hierocratic theory in 
the thirteenth century, but also the view that the hierocratic theory ‘was a self-evident 
condition and basis of private and public life’.336 However, this match has been 
shown to be inexact, both from reservations concerning the validity of the phrase 
‘hierocratic theory’ and due to Kuhn’s clarifications of the paradigm concept in SSR’s 
second edition Postscript. 
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Concerning the difficulty of the validity of the term ‘hierocratic theory’, it has been 
shown how aspects of this theory can only be found occasionally in the writings of its 
supposed adherents. There was no uniformity on whether the pope could act directly 
or indirectly in the temporal sphere, on whether the pope holds rights to all secular 
power intrinsically in his office or only via a donation, or even whether the term 
‘pope’ referred solely to the person elected ‘pope’ or included also the college of 
cardinals. Practically, many of these differences may not have mattered too much. 
However, if ‘paradigm’ means ‘major regnant theory’, there would appear to have 
been no coherent, dominant hierocratic theory to class as a paradigm. 
 
The fact that—for the most part—the differences in the positions between the 
supposed adherents to the hierocratic theory were not great in practice leaves the door 
open to seeing them as part of the same community adhering to one view of papal 
monarchy, diversified through the sociological filter of the Disciplinary Matrix. If 
unity was not construed in terms of uniformity then this could have been the case. 
Kuhn’s interest was in accounting for such plurality in unity, and in the second edition 
Postscript for SSR Kuhn expounded ways to account for it. The Disciplinary Matrix 
allows plurality within unity, although Kuhn’s position has required modification by 
introducing a Global Paradigm behind the Disciplinary Matrix to enable his theory to 
hold together.  
 
There are, however, problems in positing a ‘papalist’ community. Some of the 
supposed adherents were canonists, others were publicists. These two groups (if even 
they themselves constituted groups) were writing for very different purposes and in 
markedly different ways. Furthermore, some of the supposed members of this 
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community lived at very different times—the best part of one-hundred years separated 
Innocent III from Giles of Rome when the latter wrote De Ecclesiastica Potestate (c. 
1301) . There is a danger of creating a hierocratic/papalist community when there 
never was one. Certainly the canonists influenced the publicists and vice-versa, but 
this was in the form of incremental development, not of one theoretical position 
expressing itself in manifold ways. There is also the difficulty of establishing 
membership of this community. Did Giles of Rome have a papalist/hierocratic 
worldview or not? Unlike modern science there are no formal tests to prove whether a 
person has a politico-religious worldview. A scientific worldview is gained through 
the standard educational procedure of engaging with exemplars. This is not so for 
politico-religious worldviews, which could be could be gained in a variety of ways. 
Politico-religious positions could also be expressed by somebody with the apparent 
conviction of somebody who held these beliefs as part of a worldview, although the 
person was not being sincere. 
 
Finally, there is a problem of ascertaining the boundaries of the hierocratic theory 
now that unity is not construed in terms of uniformity. If diversity is permitted, where 
does diversity become unacceptable? John of Paris’ views appear to have been 
beyond what would have been acceptable to hierocrats, for he greatly limited papal 
power, authority, and jurisdiction, positing dual headship of Christian society. What, 
though, about the ‘average’ Christian who did not express in words antipapalist 
opinions such as John’s? The mistake is to interpret ‘silence’ as ‘acceptance’. The 
average Christian did not have the education to express any opposition they may have 
harboured against the pope. Universal acceptance of the papalist position was a 
theological assumption, not an historical fact. While in general there was obedience to 
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the pope in the thirteenth century, this may have been as much acquiescence in a 
system which benefited a good number of people as acceptance of the papalist theory. 
Papal monarchy, then, was not a paradigm which determined the mindset of the 
populace of Western Christendom. Rather, it determined the mindset only of some of 
those who engaged with Papalist arguments. Others may have engaged with such 
arguments for the purposes of pragmatism or personal gain. Yet others still would not 
have understood such arguments and/or did not have those arguments presented to 
them. While culturally the pope would have been a well-known figure, the 
complexities regarding the nature of his office were variously interpreted and/or little 
heard of or understood. 
 
There were, then, a plurality of beliefs concerning papal monarchy in the thirteenth 
century, both among the educated and between the educated and the uneducated. 
Terms such as ‘Paradigm’ or ‘hierocratic theory’ disguise such variety. As for the 
paradigm concept in particular, it is not simply a ‘major regnant theory’, but a theory 
based on an influential text (such as Newton’s Principia) which has become the basis 
for a professional community. The community is held together because, for all their 
diversity, they have undergone a similar professional initiation by working through 
exemplars. 
 
It would appear that the paradigm concept does not admit of extension to political-
religious groups, especially those in a past with no immediate connection to the 
present. From both actions and words it is very difficult to establish whether people 
from a historical past adhered to one or another worldview, which consequently 
militates against seeing a community of this sort as a potential Global Paradigm. As 
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for future research on the paradigm concept, it might be fruitful to test its application 
in terms of recognised non-scientific academic disciplines, ones where community 
membership is externally testable; it would be a challenge to ascertain whether 
membership of such disciplines could be historically established. If ‘paradigm’ should 
have a life in Medieval Studies, ‘The medieval science of canon law’337 may be a 
good candidate for investigation. 
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